Non-Self-Executing Treaties: Exposing a Constitutional Fallacy by Sloss, David
Santa Clara Law
Santa Clara Law Digital Commons
Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
2002
Non-Self-Executing Treaties: Exposing a
Constitutional Fallacy
David Sloss
Santa Clara University School of Law, dlsloss@scu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
36 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1
0.> University
U.C. DAVIS LAW REVIEW , j California
Davis
VOLUME 36 NOVEMBER 2002 NUMBER 1
Non-Self-Executing Treaties: Exposing
a Constitutional Fallacy
David Sloss*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
IN TRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 3
I. TH E IN TENT TH ESIS ................................................................................. 8
A . Tw o K ey C oncepts ........................................................................... 9
1. The Relationship Between Domestic and
International Law ................................................................ 9
2. Primary Law and Remedial Law .................................. 10
B. The Four Versions of the Intent Thesis ...................................... 12
II. THE FOSTER DOCTRINE .................................................................... 19
A. Foster and the Nineteenth Century Concept of Executory
Treaty Provisions ...................................................................... 19
1. Foster and Percheman ....................................................... 19
2. Subsequent Nineteenth Century Decisions ................... 21
'Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. B.A. Hampshire
College, M.P.P., Harvard University, J.D., Stanford University. The author wishes to thank
David Bederman, Curtis Bradley, Eric Claeys, Lori Fisler Damrosch, Maria Frankowska,
Roger Goldman, Joel Goldstein, Louis Henkin, Dan Hulsebosch, Derek Jinks, Harold Koh,
Eric Stein, Phillip Trimble, Detlev Vagts, Carlos Vizquez, and David Weissbrodt for their
comments on previous drafts of this Article. The author also thanks Douglas Hickel and
Kristen Kadleck for their research assistance.
HeinOnline  -- 36 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1 2002-2003
University of California, Davis
3. Foster and the Intent Thesis ............................................ 23
B. The Indirect Remedial Version of the Intent Thesis (Foster
D octrine) .................................................................................. . . 24
1. Indeterminate Treaty Provisions ................................... 25
2. Executory Treaty Provisions ............................................ 25
3. Horizontal Treaty Provisions ......................................... 27
III. THE WHITNEY DOCTRINE .................................................................. 29
A. The Indirect Primary Version of the Intent Thesis (Whitney
D octrine) .................................................................................... 29
B. The Supreme Court's Decision in Whitney .............................. 31
IV . THE CARTER DOCTRINE ..................................................................... 35
A. NSE Declarations Mean that Treaties are not Primary
D om estic Law ............................................................................ 37
B. NSE Declarations Mean that Treaties are not Judicially
E nforceable ................................................................................ 38
1. Plaintiffs in Federal Court ............................................... 39
2. Defendants in State Court ............................................... 41
C. NSE Declarations Mean that Treaties do not Create Private
Causes of A ction .......................................................................... 44
V. A CRITIQUE OF THE RESTATEMENT DOCTRINE ................................. 45
A. The Plain Meaning of the Supremacy Clause ............................ 46
1. Made.. .Under the Authority of the United States ............ 48
2. All Treaties are Supreme Law of the Land .................. 49
3. Shall B e ............................................................................... 52
B. Article II and the Restatement Doctrine ................................... 55
1. Structural Considerations - The Treaty Power and
the Supremacy Clause ..................................................... 56
2. Professor Yoo and the Framers' Intentions ................... 61
3. Professor V~zquez' Defense of the Restatement
D octrin e .............................................................................. 63
4. Implications of Rejecting the Restatement Doctrine ........ 67
C. Doctrinal Supportfor the Restatement Doctrine ....................... 70
1. Supreme Court Precedent ............................................... 71
2. Precursors of the Restatement Doctrine ........................ 73
3. The Restatement (Second) and Its Aftermath .............. 76
VI. A FRAMEWORK FOR JUDICIAL ANALYSIS .......................................... 80
[Vol. 36:1
HeinOnline  -- 36 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 2 2002-2003
Non-Self-Executing Treaties
INTRODUCTION
As the world's nations become increasingly interdependent, they
conclude a greater number of treaties that regulate matters previously
thought to be domestic in nature. In recent years, the United States has
become a party to treaties addressing such diverse topics as unsafe
working conditions, adoption of children, and racial discrimination.'
Private litigants have asked U.S. courts to enforce provisions of treaties
that regulate matters such as intellectual property protection,
enforcement of arbitration awards, and capital punishment
In the United States, the increasing use of treaties to regulate
"domestic" conduct exacerbates the tension between two conflicting
policy goals. On the one hand, the political branches have a legitimate
desire to preserve their flexibility to manage the domestic
implementation of treaties. This policy goal finds support in
constitutional provisions that allocate power over the conduct of U.S.
foreign relations to the political branches. Any approach to
constitutional interpretation that gives the judiciary too much control
over treaty enforcement would conflict with fundamental separation of
3powers principles. On the other hand, the United States has an
important national interest in ensuring compliance with its treaty
obligations, absent an unambiguous decision at the highest levels of
government that noncompliance with a specific treaty is warranted in a
particular case. This policy goal finds support in our commitment to the
rule of law. Any approach to constitutional interpretation that gives the
judiciary too little control over treaty enforcement undermines the rule
of law.4
' See Convention (No. 176) Concerning Safety and Health in Mines, June 22, 1995, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 106-8 (1999); Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in
Respect of Intercountry Adoption, May 29, 1993, S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-51 (1998);
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened
for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (ratified by U.S. in 1994).
2 See, e.g., Int'l Cafe, S.A.L. v. Hard Rock Cafe Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc., 252 F.3d 1274 (11th
Cir. 2001) (determining jurisdiction to hear foreign plaintiff's claim under international
trademark treaty); Stephens v. Am. Int'l Ins. Co., 66 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1995) (deciding that
Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards does not compel
arbitration); Domingues v. State, 961 P.2d 1279 (Nev. 1998) (rejecting defense against
capital punishment based on human rights treaty).
' Professor Yoo's writings in this area have emphasized this point. See John C. Yoo,
Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (1999) [hereinafter Yoo, Globalism]; John C. Yoo, Rejoinder, Treaties and
Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense of Non-Self-Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
2218 (1999) [hereinafter Yoo, Rejoinder].
' Professor Paust's scholarship has highlighted this issue. See Jordan J. Paust,
2002]
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The doctrine of non-self-executing treaties, as developed by the
Supreme Court in the nineteenth century, struck an appropriate balance
between competing rule of law and separation of powers principles.
However, the modem doctrine of non-self-executing treaties, created by
courts and commentators in the latter half of the twentieth century,
distorts that balance. The root of the problem is the "intent thesis."
The intent thesis holds that the intent of the treaty makers determines• 5
whether a treaty is self-executing or non-self-executing. This
proposition is widely accepted among courts and commentators. The
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law,6  key U.S. government
publications,7 and the leading treatise on U.S. foreign relations law' all
endorse the intent thesis. Several leading international law casebooks9
and law review articles0 also support the intent thesis. Judicial opinions
frequently invoke the intent thesis as a point of departure for their
analysis in treaty cases." Unfortunately, the intent thesis has rarely been
Customary International Law and Human Rights Treaties are Law of the United States, 20 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 301 (1999) [hereinafter Faust, Customary International Law]; Jordan J. Paust, Avoiding
"Fraudulent" Executive Policy: Analysis of Non-Self-Execution of the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1257 (1993) [hereinafter Paust, Fraudulent Executive
Policy]; Jordan J. Faust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 760 (1988) [hereinafter
Paust, Self-Executing Treaties].
' See LORI FISLER DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 206-
07 (4th ed. 2001).
6 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
111(4) (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)] (stating that treaty is non-self-executing
"if the agreement manifests an intention that it shall not become effective as domestic law
without the enactment of implementing legislation").
7 See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., 103d CONG., 1ST SESS., TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 47-49 (Comm.
Print 1993); 14 MARJORIE M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 29, 310-11 (1970)
(published by the U.S. Dept. of State) (hereinafter Whiteman DIGEST).
' See LouIs HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 201 (2d
ed. 1996) (stating that "whether a treaty is to be self-executing or not depends on... what
the parties intended... ").
9 See, e.g., BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 180-83 (2d ed.
1995); DAMROSCH, supra note 5, at 206-07 (4th ed. 2001); HENRY J. STEINER ET AL.,
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS: MATERIALS AND TEXT 556 n.1 (4th ed. 1994). But see
JORDAN J. PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LITIGATION IN THE U.S. 172-79 (2000)
[hereinafter PAUST, LAW AND LIIGATION] (critiquing doctrine of non-self-executing
treaties).
"o See, e.g., John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy
Analysis, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 310, 328 (1992); Carlos M. Vizquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-
Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 695, 700-10 (1995) [hereinafter Vdzquez, Four Doctrines];
Ann Woolhandler, Treaties, Self-Execution, and the Public Law Litigation Model, 42 VA. J. INT'L
L. 757, 761 (2002); Yoo, Rejoinder, supra note 3, at 2254-56.
" See, e.g., Beazley v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 248, 267 (5th Cir. 2001); Lidas, Inc. v. United
States, 238 F.3d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 2001); Barapind v. Reno, 225 F.3d 1100, 1107 (9th Cir.
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the subject of critical analysis.12
The intent thesis, as applied by courts and commentators, conflates
four very different assumptions about the distribution of constitutional
power over treaties:
(1) the Foster doctrine of non-self-execution assumes that there are
prudential and/or constitutional limits on the judiciary's power to
enforce treaties;
13
(2) the Whitney doctrine of non-self-execution assumes that there are
constitutional limits on the treaty makers' power to create primary
domestic law by means of treaties;
14
(3) the Carter doctrine assumes that the treaty makers have an
unlimited power to prevent the judiciary from enforcing a treaty
after it is ratified, irrespective of the nature of the international
obligation embodied in that treaty;"5 and
(4) the Restatement doctrine assumes that the treaty makers have an
unlimited power to prevent a treaty from becoming primary
domestic law after it is ratified, irrespective of the nature of the
16international obligation embodied in that treaty.
2000); United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 71 (1st Cir. 2000) (Torruella, C.J.,
concurring/dissenting); Goldstar (Panama) S.A. v. United States, 967 F.2d 965, 968 (4th Cir.
1992); More v. Intelcom Support Services, Inc., 960 F.2d 466, 469 (5th Cir. 1992); Haitian
Refugee Center v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498, 1522-23 (11th Cir. 1992).
12 There are some notable exceptions. See Yuji Iwasawa, The Doctrine of Self-Executing
Treaties in the United States: A Critical Analysis, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 627, 654-70 (1986)
(distinguishing among several different ways in which intent allegedly affects self-
execution, and discriminating between helpful and unhelpful intent tests); Stefan A.
Riesenfeld, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties and U.S. v. Postal: Win at Any Price?, 74
AM J. INT'L L. 892, 895-96 (1980) (distinguishing between international and domestic
constitutional aspects of self-execution issue, and contending that intent is relevant only to
international aspect); Vizquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 10, at 704-10 (discussing
application of intent thesis in lower courts).
, The Foster doctrine can be traced to the Supreme Court's decision in Foster v.
Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829). See infra Part II.
" The Whitney doctrine, in some sense, predates the Supreme Court's decision in
Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888). However, that decision was crucial because it
was the first to apply the "self-execution" label to the concept that this article calls the
Whitney doctrine. See infra Part II.
s The "Carter doctrine" is associated with the treaty makers' practice of attaching non-
self-executing declarations to treaties, a practice that originated in 1978 when President
Carter submitted four human rights treaties to the Senate. See infra Part IV.
16 Although there were precursors of the Restatement doctrine prior to publication of
the Second Restatement in 1965, courts did not generally apply the doctrine until after the
20021
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The modern doctrine of non-self-executing treaties combines these
four assumptions into a single doctrine without distinguishing among
them.17  Consequently, it generates confused judicial analyses and
undermines the rule of law.
This Article critically examines the four assumptions noted above,
attempting to strike an appropriate balance between conflicting rule of
law and separation of powers principles. The Article contends that the
Whitney and Foster doctrines make sense because they are consistent with
the structure of the constitution, which endows each branch of
government with only limited powers. In contrast, the Carter doctrine is
problematic. The treaty makers do have a broad power to limit judicial
enforcement of ratified treaties. However, the proposition that they have
an unlimited power to preclude judicial enforcement altogether is at
odds with fundamental precepts concerning the role of an independent
judiciary in preserving the rule of law.
Concerns about the Carter doctrine aside, this Article's central thesis is
that the Restatement doctrine should be abandoned because it subverts
both rule of law and separation of powers values without advancing any
important policy goal. When a court holds that a treaty is non-self-
executing, that holding, if it matters at all, typically means that the court
denies a party a remedy for a treaty violation. 1 In terms of rule of law
principles, the denial of a judicial remedy for a treaty violation must be
counted as a cost.19 When courts apply the Whitney or Foster doctrines,
that cost is offset by a separation of powers benefit. In particular,
separation of powers limits on the treaty making power (Whitney) or the
judicial power (Foster) justify the denial of a remedy. In contrast, there
are no separation of powers benefits associated with the Restatement
doctrine.0 Moreover, judicial application of the Restatement doctrine
sometimes triggers a U.S. violation of its treaty obligations without any
Second Restatement endorsed the Restatement doctrine. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 141 (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)]. For an analysis of the Second Restatement and its impact on the evolution of
non-self-execution doctrine, see infra notes 332-349 and accompanying text.
" Professor Vhzquez has also identified four distinct doctrines of non-self-executing
treaties. See Vhzquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 10; see also Carlos M. Vizquez, Laughing at
Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2154, 2176-83 (1999) [hereinafter Vhzquez, Laughing] (outlining
four doctrines of self-executing treaties). For a comparison of his fourfold division to mine,
see infra notes 102 and 127.
See infra notes 61-71.
, See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional
Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1997) (noting that one key element of rule of law ideal is
that "[clourts should be available to enforce the law").
20 See infra notes 255-264 and 296-308 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 36:1
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authorization from the political branches. 2' That outcome is manifestly
inconsistent with separation of powers principles because the decision
whether to violate a treaty obligation is constitutionally committed to the
political branches, not the judiciary.
Although many lower court opinions and scholarly writings endorse
the Restatement doctrine, either implicitly or explicitly,2 that doctrine
cannot be reconciled with the text and structure of the United States
Constitution. The Supreme Court has never endorsed the view that the
treaty makers have an unlimited power to prevent a ratified treaty from
becoming domestic law.2 Moreover, the treaty makers have never
24purported to exercise such a power. When the United States ratifies a
treaty that creates primary international legal duties, the Supremacy
Clause mandates automatic conversion of those international duties into
primary domestic law, except insofar as constitutional constraints
preclude automatic conversion of a particular duty.25 Whether the treaty
makers intended to create primary domestic law is irrelevant, because
constitutional rules determine whether a particular provision of a
ratified treaty creates primary domestic law; and the treaty makers do
not have the power to alter those constitutional rules.26
Several commentators have critically examined non-self-execution
doctrine, but this Article's approach is unique. Professors Yoo and
Woolhandler generally defend non-self-execution doctrine, without
27distinguishing among the different variants of the doctrine. Professor
Paust generally repudiates non-self-execution doctrine, also without
211distinguishing among the different versions. Professor Vfzquez
21 See infra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
22 Courts and commentators generally avoid explicit endorsement of the proposition
that the treaty makers have an unlimited power to preclude treaties from becoming
domestic law. Even so, that assumption is implicit in numerous judicial opinions and other
writings. See infra notes 332-349 and accompanying text. Because the assumption is
implicit, it has remained largely unexamined. But see Vhzquez, Laughing, supra note 17, at
2186-88 (defending thesis that treaty makers have power to countermand Supremacy
Clause).
See infra notes 309-318 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 296-308 and accompanying text.
2' U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("[A]ll Treaties made.., under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land."). See infra notes 203-241 and accompanying
text (analyzing Supremacy Clause and defending interpretation of that Clause in
accordance with "qualified automatic conversion rule").
26 Accord, Riesenfeld, supra note 12, at 895-96.
27 See Woolhandler, supra note 10; Yoo, Globalism, supra note 3; Yoo, Rejoinder, supra
note 3.
' See Paust, Fraudulent Executive Policy, supra note 4; Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, supra
note 4.
2002]
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distinguishes among four different versions of the doctrine, but fails to
discriminate between valid and invalid versions, treating all four as
equally valid.29  Professor Iwasawa distinguishes among different
versions of self-execution doctrine, accepting some and rejecting others,
but fails to expose the erroneous, unstated constitutional assumption
underlying the Restatement doctrineYm Professor Riesenfeld challenges
the constitutional underpinnings of the Restatement doctrine, but his
analysis is quite brief and his work is now somewhat dated.3' This
Article is the first to present a detailed defense of the thesis that the
Restatement doctrine is founded upon a mistaken constitutional
assumption.
Part I examines the "intent thesis." It demonstrates that the intent
thesis is the root cause of confusion surrounding the doctrine of non-self-
executing treaties because courts and commentators fail to distinguish
among four different versions of the intent thesis, each of which is
founded upon a different assumption about the distribution of
constitutional power over treaty making and/or treaty enforcement.
Parts II through V, respectively, analyze the Foster doctrine, the Whitney
doctrine, the Carter doctrine, and the Restatement doctrine. Part VI, the
concluding section of this Article, sketches an analytic framework for
courts to utilize in cases where litigants raise treaty-based claims or
defenses. In place of the current doctrinal approach, where courts
pursue a generalized inquiry as to whether the treaty makers intended a
particular treaty provision to be self-executing, Part VI recommends a
step-by-step approach that divides the self-execution inquiry into its
component parts. The key insight underlying this step-by-step approach
is this: where power is lacking, intent is irrelevant. Therefore, the
discrete steps in the analysis focus on the treaty makers' intent only
insofar as the treaty makers have the constitutional power to accomplish
a specified purpose.
I. THE INTENT THESIS
Part I analyzes the intent thesis, thereby exposing the four different
constitutional assumptions that are hidden beneath the surface of non-
self-execution doctrine. The first section of Part I briefly discusses the
relationship between domestic and international law, and the distinction
' See Vzquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 10; Vizquez, Laughing, supra note 17.
' See Iwasawa, supra note 12.
", See Riesenfeld, supra note 12.
[Vol. 36:1
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between primary and remedial law. This lays the conceptual
groundwork for a detailed analysis of the intent thesis, which follows in
the second section.
A. Two Key Concepts
1. The Relationship Between Domestic and International Law
Professor Bradley defines the "monist" view of the relationship
between international and domestic law as a view "that international
and domestic law are part of the same legal order,... and international
law is supreme over domestic law."32  He contrasts this with the
"dualist" view, which holds that "international and domestic law are
distinct,... and the status of international law in the domestic system is
determined by domestic law."33 This Article assumes that the dualist
view, as defined herein, better describes the relationship between
international and domestic law. In short, domestic law, not international
law, determines the domestic legal effects of treaty ratification.
The preceding definitions of the terms "monist" and "dualist" must be
distinguished from a different usage of the terms that differentiate
between monist and dualist domestic legal systems. In this sense of the
terms, a country has a "monist" legal system if international treaty
provisions are automatically converted into domestic law without the
need for implementing legislation.3 In contrast, a country has a
"dualist" legal system if its law requires implementing legislation to
convert international treaty obligations into domestic law.3 ' The dualist
view of the relationship between international and domestic law insists
that domestic law, not international law, determines whether treaties
have domestic legal force in the absence of implementing legislation.
3'2 Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist Conception,
51 STAN. L. REV. 529, 530 (1999).
Id. For a slightly different presentation of the distinction between monism and
dualism, see IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 32-34 (4th ed.
1990).
' The term "monist" might also be used to signify that customary international law is
automatically incorporated into domestic law. Since this article focuses on treaties, not
customary international law, I define the term with respect to treaties.
' The United Kingdom has a dualist legal system in this sense. See Lord Templeman,
Treaty-Making and the British Parliament, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 459, 467-69 (1991). The
Netherlands, though, has a monist legal system. Pieter van Dijk & Bahiyyih G. Tahzib,
Parliamentary Participation in the Treaty-Making Process of the Netherlands, 67 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 413,418 (1991).
2002]
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However, the dualist view of the relationship between international and
domestic law is entirely consistent with the proposition that some
domestic legal systems are partially or wholly monist.
Although this Article accepts the dualist view of the relationship
between domestic and international law, the Article contends that the
United States' domestic legal system is largely (but not entirely) monist
in the sense that most treaty provisions are automatically converted into
domestic law at the time of treaty ratification, without the need for
implementing legislation. The Article does not contend that
international law requires automatic incorporation of treaties; that
argument would be inconsistent with the dualist view of the relationship
between domestic and international law. Rather, the Article contends
that U.S. domestic law, specifically the Supremacy Clause," mandates
automatic conversion of treaties in most (but not all) cases.37
2. Primary Law and Remedial Law
Primary legal rules describe the type of conduct that is legally
permitted or prohibited. In contrast, a remedial legal rule describes
"what happens in the event of noncompliance or other deviation" from
the primary rules]8 Thus, for example, the rule that murder is prohibited
is a primary legal rule. In contrast, the rule that the surviving spouse of
a murder victim may file a lawsuit to seek compensation from the
murderer is a remedial legal rule.
Not every individual who is harmed by a violation of a primary law is
entitled to a judicial remedy.39 Therefore, the statement that a treaty
provision establishes a primary domestic legal rule does not necessarily
mean that an individual is entitled to a judicial remedy for every
violation of that treaty provision. Similarly, the statement that an
individual cannot obtain a judicial remedy for a treaty violation does not
necessarily mean that the treaty lacks the status of primary domestic law.
In short, the question whether a treaty provision creates primary
domestic law is different from the question whether, and in what
circumstances, an individual can obtain a judicial remedy for a violation
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
3' See infra notes 203-241 and accompanying text (defending interpretation of
Supremacy Clause in accordance with qualified automatic conversion rule).
m HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 122 (1994) [hereinafter HART & SACKS].
' See id. at 136.
[Vol. 36:1
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of that treaty provision.4°
Many courts and commentators have contended that if there is no
possible judicial remedy for a violation of a primary law, then the
ostensible law is not a primary law at all.41 In treaty cases, in particular,
courts often resort to a mode of analysis that can be summarized in the
following syllogism: "If there is no remedy, there is no primary law;
since the treaty does not provide a remedy, the treaty lacks the status of
primary law., 42 Hart and Sacks criticize this mode of analysis because it
confuses the distinction "between a primary claim to a performance and
a remedial capacity to invoke a sanction for nonperformance. ... ,,43 "It is
the essence of clear analysis," they say, "to see that [this approach] is
backwards, and instead to think frontwards." 44 To think "frontwards" in
treaty cases, courts should first ask whether a treaty provision has the
status of primary domestic law and then, if the first question is answered
affirmatively, consider the availability of judicial remedies for a violation
of that treaty provision.
40 Accord, Iwasawa, supra note 12, at 643-46 (distinguishing between domestic validity,
which is primary law concept, and direct applicability, which is remedial law concept).
" See, e.g., Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 458 (1897)
(claiming that it puts "the cart before the horse... to consider the right or the duty as
something existing apart from and independent of the consequences of its breach, to which
certain sanctions are added afterward.... [A] legal duty so called is nothing but a
prediction that if a man does or omits certain things he will be made to suffer in this or that
way by judgment of the court.").
42 For example, in Jama v INS, 22 F. Supp. 2d 353 (D.N.J. 1998), the court held that the
Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) "provides both jurisdiction and a cause of action for claims
under customary international law." Id. at 362. If the ATCA provides a cause of action for
torts committed in violation of the law of nations, then the statute must also provide a
cause of action for treaty violations because the statute, by its terms, applies equally to
treaties. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States."). Yet the court in Jama held that plaintiffs could not bring suit
under the ATCA for violations of non-self-executing treaties because such treaties do not
"give rise to a private right of action." Jama, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 362. This reasoning makes
sense only if one assumes that a treaty that does not "give rise to a private right of action"
is not a "treaty" within the meaning of the ATCA - that is, it lacks the status of primary
law.
41 HART & SACKS, supra note 38, at 136. The discussion in HART & SACKS is not focused
on treaties, as such. Their point is more general, but it applies equally to treaties.
' Id. See also Henry M. Hart, Jr., Holmes' Positivism - An Addendum, 64 HARV. L. REV.
929, 935 (1951) ("Holmes' 'cart' is the horse and his 'horse' is the cart.... The remedial
parts of law - rights of action and other sanctions - are subsidiary. To the primary parts
they have the relation of means to ends. They come second not first.").
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B. The Four Versions of the Intent Thesis
The intent thesis holds that the intent of the treaty makers determines
whether a treaty is self-executing or non-self-executing. Implicit in this
proposition is the assumption that the treaty makers have the power to
render a treaty non-self-executing. If the treaty makers lacked that
power, their intent to make a treaty non-self-executing would be
irrelevant. Thus, the question arises, "Do the treaty makers have the
power to render a treaty non-self-executing?"
The answer to that question depends upon what it means to claim that
the treaty makers have such a power. The term "non-self-executing"
could mean either: (a) that a treaty lacks the status of primary domesticS 45
law (a "primary law" concept of non-self-execution), or (b) that courts
are not authorized to provide judicial remedies for treaty violations (a
1 46
"remedial law" concept of non-self-execution). Moreover, the
statement that the treaty makers have the power to render a treaty non-
self-executing might mean either: (a) that they have the power to control
the domestic legal effects of treaty ratification by and through the
international law they create (an "indirect version" of the intent thesis);
or (b) that they have the power to control the domestic legal effects of
treaty ratification without modifying the international legal obligations
embodied in the treaty (a "direct version" of the intent thesis).47 In light
of these two distinctions, there are four different versions of the intent
thesis, which are presented in the following table.
" See infra note 337 (citing cases that manifest primary law concept of self-execution).
See, e.g., United States v. Duarte-Acero, 208 F.3d 1282, 1284 n.8 (11th Cir. 2000)
(stating that although treaty is "the supreme law of the land," "treaties that are not self-
executing require implementing legislation before individuals can rely on their provisions
in U.S. courts"); Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 622 (4th Cir. 1998) (Butzner, J., concurring)
(self-executing treaty is one that "provides rights to individuals rather than merely setting
out the obligations of signatories"); More v. Intelcom, 960 F.2d 466, 469 (5th Cir. 1992)
(stating that treaties "are the law of the land ... but if not implemented by appropriate
legislation they do not provide the basis for a private lawsuit unless they are intended to be
self-executing").
" Other scholars have highlighted the importance of the distinction between "primary
law" and "remedial law" versions of self-execution doctrine. See, e.g., Iwasawa, supra note
12, at 635-45; Vhzquez, Laughing, supra note 17, at 2176-83; Vhzquez, Four Doctrines, supra
note 10; Carlos Manuel V~zquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM.
L. REV. 1082, 1117-23 (1992) [hereinafter Vhzquez, Treaty-Based Rights]. However, scholars
have generally failed to recognize the crucial distinction between "direct" and "indirect"
versions of the intent thesis.
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Remedial Law Concept of Primary Law Concept of Self-
Self-Execution Execution
Treaty Makers Foster doctrine - treaty Whitney doctrine - treaty
Shape Domestic makers' intent determines makers' intent determines
Law Indirectly international obligation, which international obligation, which
(through affects availability of judicial affects treaty's status as
international law) remedies primary domestic law
Treaty Makers Carter doctrine - treaty Restatement doctrine - treaty
Shape Domestic makers' intent directly makers' intent directly controls
Law Directly controls the availability of treaty's status as primary
(without affecting judicial remedies domestic law
international law) II
Under the Foster doctrine, the statement that a treaty provision is non-
self-executing means that, even though the provision has the status of
primary domestic law, courts are not authorized to provide judicial
remedies for treaty violations because the provision at issue is not the
type of law that the judiciary is competent to enforce.a Thus, the Foster
doctrine presupposes that there are constitutional and/or prudential
limits on the judiciary's power to enforce treaties. 49 Under the Foster
doctrine, the treaty makers have an affirmative power to craft a non-self-
executing treaty provision, but they can exercise that power only
indirectly, by crafting an international legal obligation that, when
converted into domestic law, gives rise to the type of domestic duty that
is not judicially enforceable because of limitations on the judicial power.
Thus, when courts apply the Foster doctrine, the relevant inquiry is not
whether the treaty makers intended to create a non-self-executing treaty.
Instead, the relevant inquiries are: (1) what type of international legal
obligation did they intend to create? and (2) is that the type of
international legal obligation that is not judicially enforceable because
the domestic legal duty that arises from automatic conversion is beyond
the scope of judicial competence?
Under the Whitney doctrine, the statement that a treaty provision is
non-self-executing means that the provision lacks the status of primary
domestic law because it is outside the scope of the treaty makers'
' See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829). For a defense of this
interpretation of Foster, see infra notes 73-101 and accompanying text.
" For analysis of the limits on the judiciary's power to enforce treaties, see infra notes
102-125 and accompanying text.
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domestic lawmaking powers .5 Thus, the Whitney doctrine presupposes
that there are constitutional limits on automatic conversion of treaties
into primary domestic law."1 Under the Whitney doctrine, the treaty
makers do have an affirmative power to craft a non-self-executing treaty
provision. However, they can exercise that power only indirectly, by
crafting an international legal obligation that cannot be automatically
converted into domestic law because of constitutional limitations on
automatic conversion. Thus, when courts apply the Whitney doctrine,
the relevant inquiry is not whether the treaty makers intended to create a
non-self-executing treaty. Rather, the relevant inquiries are: (1) what
type of international legal obligation did they intend to create? and (2) is
that the type of international legal obligation that cannot be
automatically converted into primary domestic law because it is beyond
the scope of the treaty makers' domestic lawmaking powers?
Under the Carter doctrine, the statement that a treaty provision is non-
self-executing means that, even though the provision has the status of
primary domestic law, courts are not authorized to provide judicial
remedies for treaty violations because the treaty makers intended to
preclude judicial remedies for treaty violations.52 Because the treaty
makers' intent is relevant only insofar as they have the power to execute
that intent, the Carter doctrine presupposes that the treaty makers have
an unlimited power to prevent the judiciary from enforcing a treaty after
it is ratified, irrespective of the nature of the international obligation
embodied in that treaty. Insofar as the Carter doctrine is valid, the treaty
makers have an affirmative power to preclude judicial enforcement of
treaty provisions that do have the status of primary domestic law and
that are within the scope of judicial competence. Moreover, the treaty
makers can exercise that power directly, without modifying the
international legal obligations embodied in the treaty.
Under the Restatement doctrine, the statement that a treaty provision
is non-self-executing means that the provision lacks the status of primary
domestic law because the treaty makers did not intend for it to become
primary domestic law.53 Given that the treaty makers' intent is relevant
only insofar as they have the power to carry out that intent, the
' See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888). For a defense of this
interpretation of Whitney, see infra notes 135-155 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 127-134.
52 For discussion of the relationship between the Carter doctrine and non-self-
executing declarations, see infra notes 156-164 and accompanying text.
11 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 141, supra note 16. See also infra notes 332-333 and
accompanying text.
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Restatement doctrine presupposes that the treaty makers have an
unlimited power to prevent a treaty from becoming primary domestic
law after it is ratified, irrespective of the nature of the international
obligation embodied in the treaty. Notwithstanding the Supremacy
Clause, which states explicitly that "all Treaties made... under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land,"-
54
the Restatement doctrine holds that the treaty makers have an
affirmative power to decide that a ratified treaty will not be converted
into primary domestic law, even though there are no constitutional
impediments to automatic conversion. Moreover, under the Restatement
doctrine, the treaty makers can exercise that power directly, without
modifying the international legal obligations embodied in the treaty.
The two indirect versions of the intent thesis (Foster and Whitney
doctrines) both presuppose that the treaty makers have the power to
shape domestic law indirectly. That assumption is unassailable. Because
Article II of the Constitution gives the treaty makers the power to create
international law,5 and the Supremacy Clause accords treaties the status
of primary domestic law,56 the combination of the two provisions gives
the treaty makers the power to shape domestic law by and through the
international legal obligations they create. However, it is unclear
whether either provision, alone or in combination, gives the treaty
makers the power to shape domestic law directly - that is,
independently of the international legal obligations they create. The two
direct versions of the intent thesis (Carter and Restatement doctrines)
focus on the manner in which the treaty makers' intent directly shapes
domestic law. If the treaty makers lacked the power to shape domestic
law directly, then the two direct versions of the intent thesis would be ill
conceived, because the treaty makers' intent to shape domestic law
directly would be irrelevant. This Article contends that the Constitution
does not give the treaty makers a power to shape primary domestic law
directly. Therefore, the Restatement doctrine is flawed because it is
founded upon an erroneous assumption about the treaty makers'
57
constitutional powers. In contrast, the Carter doctrine is valid insofar
as it assumes that the treaty makers have a limited power to shape
domestic remedies directly. However, the Carter doctrine is invalid
insofar as it assumes that the treaty makers have an unlimited power to
U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2.
s U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
See infra notes 220-228 and accompanying text.
s See infra Part V.
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preclude judicial remedies for treaty violations.5 8
Other scholars have argued that the treaty makers have the power to
shape domestic law through bilateral or multilateral agreement, but not
through unilateral conditions that do not modify that international
agreement. s9  In contrast, this Article contends that the distinction
between bilateral and unilateral intent is unimportant, but the distinction
between direct and indirect versions of the intent thesis is crucial.6
Hence, this Article makes the following three contentions. First, the
treaty makers have the power to shape domestic law indirectly and they
can do so either unilaterally by reservation, or bilaterally or
multilaterally by agreement. Second, the treaty makers have a limited
power to shape domestic remedies directly and they can do so either
unilaterally, bilaterally, or multilaterally. Finally, the treaty makers lack
the power to shape primary domestic law directly, regardless of whether
they attempt to do so unilaterally, bilaterally, or multilaterally.
Therefore, the treaty makers cannot, even by mutual agreement,
preclude a treaty from becoming primary domestic law at the time it
becomes internationally binding.
The distinctions highlighted above are not mere academic
hairsplitting: they have substantive policy content. The Framers
included treaties in the Supremacy Clause to help promote U.S.
61
compliance with its treaty obligations. Whenever a court holds that a
treaty is non-self-executing, that holding, if it matters at all,62 yields one
' See infra Part IV.
See, e.g., John Quigley, Human Rights Defenses in U.S. Courts, 20 HuM. RTS. Q. 555,
582-85 (1998); Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, Foreword: Symposium on
Parliamentary Participation in the Making and Operation of Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 293,
296-97 (1991).
6 The distinction between direct and indirect versions of the intent thesis is not the
same as the distinction between unilateral and bilateral manifestations of intent. The treaty
makers might agree bilaterally to a treaty provision that affects domestic law, but does not
affect international law. See infra notes 247-248 and accompanying text. That would be a
bilateral effort to control domestic law directly. Alternatively, the United States can control
domestic law indirectly by adopting a unilateral reservation that modifies its international
obligations. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 19, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
6 See infra note 225 and accompanying text.
' There are three kinds of cases where a non-self-execution holding does not matter.
First, if there is no treaty violation, then the self-execution issue is inconsequential. Second,
if there is an independent rationale for denying judicial relief, then the non-self-execution
holding has no effect. Finally, there are some cases where a court might grant judicial relief
despite a non-self-execution holding. For discussion of the last point, see David Sloss, Ex
parte Young and Federal Remedies for Human Rights Treaty Violations, 75 WASH L. REV. 1103,
1122-23 (2000).
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of two results: (a) the court refuses to provide a remedy for an
acknowledged treaty violation; 3 or (b) the court refuses to decide
whether the treaty has been violated.64 In the former case, the refusal to
provide a remedy undermines the goal of treaty compliance by signaling
relevant individuals and organizations that they can violate treaty norms
without fear of domestic judicial sanctions.
In the latter case, the court's refusal to decide the issue may itself
constitute a treaty violation6 For example, under the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)66 the United States has an
international legal obligation to provide an individual hearing before an
impartial tribunal for persons who claim that their treaty rights have
been violated.67  Nevertheless, in a state court criminal trial where the
defendant raised the ICCPR as a defense to imposition of capital
punishment, the trial judge relied on the Restatement doctrine of non-
self-execution as a justification for his refusal to decide whether
imposition of the death penalty would violate the ICCPR.6s By refusing
63 See, e.g., United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 872-73 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that
boarding of a ship by Coast Guard violated article 6 of High Seas Convention) and 873-84
(nevertheless denying ship's captain judicial remedy on grounds that Convention was not
self-executing).
Professor Moore makes a similar argument in the context of his critique of the "dual
theory" of treaty interpretation. See JOHN NORTON MOORE, TREATY INTERPRETATION, THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE RULE OF LAW 28 (2001) ("Whenever... the 'Senate intent' differs
from the correct international meaning [of a treaty], then [the dual theory] will always
either require the United States to violate its solemn treaty obligations internationally or to
be held to obligations not binding on the other party or at least not bargained for.").
" In cases where a treaty does not obligate the United States to provide individual
judicial remedies for treaty violations, a court's refusal to decide the merits of an individual
claim would not constitute a treaty violation. However, in cases where a treaty does
obligate the United States to provide individual judicial remedies for treaty violations, a
court's refusal to decide the merits of an individual claim is itself a treaty violation. See
LaGrand Case (Germany v. United States), T1 79-91 (June 27, 2001) available at
http:/ /www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusframe.htm.
6 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, S. EXEC. Doc. E,
95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
67 See id., art. 2, para. 3(a). See also David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human
Rights: Non-Self-Executing Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 129, 143
(1999) (contending that human rights treaties ratified by United States impose duty on
United States "to ensure that any person who raises a non-frivolous allegation that his or
her treaty rights have been violated obtains an individual hearing before an impartial
tribunal" that is authorized to adjudicate the merits of the claim).
People v. Krebs, Case No. F 283378, Superior Court of the State of California for the
County of San Luis Obispo (unpublished disposition, on file with author). Krebs is
distinguishable from cases in which defendants have invoked the ICCPR to challenge
capital punishment of juveniles. See infra notes 181-182 and accompanying text.
Defendants have consistently lost those cases on the merits because the United States
adopted an explicit reservation exempting itself from the ICCPR obligation not to impose
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to address the merits of defendant's treaty-based defense, the court
violated the United States' international legal obligation to provide an
individual hearing on the merits of that defense. The state court's
violation of the United States' international treaty obligation directly
contravened the federal political branches' oft-expressed intent to
comply with U.S. obligations under the ICCPR, including the obligation
to provide an individual hearing before an impartial tribunal.7
Inasmuch as the state court's decision contravened the federal political
branches' intent, the treaty violation was manifestly incompatible with
both federalism and separation of powers principles, which give the
federal political branches primary responsibility for deciding whether to
violate U.S. treaty obligations.
When courts apply the Whitney or Foster doctrine of non-self-
execution, competing constitutional values, in particular, limits on the
treaty makers' domestic lawmaking powers (Whitney), or on the
judiciary's enforcement powers (Foster), justify the decision to deny a
judicial remedy. But when courts apply the Restatement doctrine, there
are no competing constitutional values. Judicial application of the
Restatement doctrine is simply a bald exercise of the power to
undermine U.S. compliance with its treaty obligations; it does not
promote any legitimate policy objective. 7  Therefore, the Restatement
doctrine should be rejected on policy grounds because it subverts U.S.
compliance with its treaty obligations without advancing any important
policy goal.
capital punishment for crimes committed by minors. In contrast, Mr. Krebs contended that
capital punishment would violate the obligation not to deprive him of his life "arbitrarily,"
ICCPR, supra note 66, art. 6, para. 1, an obligation that is binding on the United States
because the United States did not adopt a reservation to that provision.
I See Sloss, supra note 67, at 178-83 (documenting fact that political branches have
consistently affirmed their intent to comply with United States obligations under ICCPR
and other human rights treaties).
" When the United States ratified the ICCPR, it adopted reservations limiting the
scope of its international legal obligation to comply with specific treaty articles. See id. at
175-77. However, the United States did not adopt a reservation limiting its article 2,
paragraph 3, obligation to provide domestic judicial remedies for treaty violations. The
decision not to adopt a reservation is evidence of the political branches' intent to comply
with that obligation.
71 For more detailed elaboration of this point, see infra notes 255-264, 296-308 and
accompanying text.
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1I. THE FOSTER DOCTRINE
Under the Foster doctrine, ratification of a treaty automatically
converts the treaty provisions into primary domestic law. However,
non-self-executing provisions are not judicially enforceable, at least not
at the behest of private individuals. The Foster doctrine differs from the
Whitney doctrine in that Foster embodies a remedial law concept of non-
self-execution, whereas Whitney reflects a primary law concept. The
Foster doctrine differs from the Carter doctrine because Foster limits
judicial enforcement only of certain types of international legal
obligations: those that, by their nature, are beyond the judiciary's
competence to enforce. In contrast, the Carter doctrine limits judicial
enforcement of all types of international legal obligations, including
those within the scope of judicial competence, provided that the treaty
makers have manifested an intent to preclude judicial enforcement.
Part II has two sections. The first section addresses Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion in Foster v. Neilson72 and the nineteenth century
concept of executory treaty provisions. The second section discusses the
types of international legal obligations that are beyond the judiciary's
competence to enforce.
A. Foster and the Nineteenth Century Concept of Executory Treaty Provisions
The first Supreme Court decision that distinguished between
"executory" and "executed" treaty provisions was in 1796.' 3 The
distinction between executory and executed treaty provisions had its
origins in a contract law doctrine that distinguished between executory
and executed contracts. Blackstone described the distinction as follows:
"A contract may also be either executed, as if A agrees to change horses
with B, and they do it immediately... or it may be executory, as if they
agree to change next week . .." 74 In short, a contract is executed if it
promises immediate performance. A contract is executory if it promises
future performance.
1. Foster and Percheman
The distinction between contracts (or treaties) that promise immediate
performance and contracts (or treaties) that promise future performance
7' 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
1 Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 271-72 (1796) (Iredell, J., dissenting in part).
71 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 443.
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is precisely the distinction that Chief Justice Marshall recognized in
Foster.75 In Foster, the Court interpreted an 1819 treaty by which the
United States acquired Florida from Spain. Article 8 stated:
All the grants of land made before the 24th of January 1818, by his
catholic majesty [i.e., Spain], or by his lawful authorities, in the said
territories ceded by his majesty to the United States, shall be ratified
and confirmed to the persons in possession of the lands, to the same
extent that the same grants would be valid, if the territories had
remained under the dominion of his catholic majesty."76
Chief Justice Marshall noted that the treaty "does not say, that those
grants are hereby confirmed. Had such been its language, it would have
acted directly on the subject.... "77 Thus, in Marshall's view, treaty
language specifying that grants "are hereby confirmed" would be
executed, not executory, because such language creates an international
legal obligation to convey land immediately, not in the future.
However, the treaty said that land grants "shall be ratified and
confirmed." 7 The Court construed this as a promise of future action, not
a present operative grant.79 Hence, the Court concluded that, as a matter
of international law, the treaty was executory, not executed, because it
created an international legal obligation to convey property in the future;
it did not create an international legal obligation to convey property
immediately upon ratification.80
81Four years later, in United States v. Percheman, the Court revised its
interpretation of article 8. The appellee in Percheman alerted the Court to
a difference between the Spanish and English versions of article 8: "The
English side of the treaty leaves the ratification of the grants executory -
they shall be ratified; the Spanish, executed - they shall continue
acknowledged and confirmed. ,82 Based on the Spanish text, Chief Justice
Marshall overruled his own decision in Foster, holding that article 8 of
Although Chief Justice Marshall did not use the terms "executed" and "executory"
in Foster, later 19th century cases used these terms to describe the holding of Foster. See
infra notes 86-95 and accompanying text.
76 Foster, 27 U.S. at 310.
7 Id. at 314-15.
7' Id. at 310 (quoting Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limits, Feb. 22, 1819, U.S.-Spain,
art. 8).
Id. at 314 (stating that these words "pledge the faith of the United States to pass acts
which shall ratify and confirm" the land grants in the future).
w Id. at 314-15.
" 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).
82 Id. at 69.
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the 1819 treaty was executed, not executory.
No violence is done to the language of the treaty by a construction
which conforms the English and Spanish to each other. Although
the words "shall be ratified and confirmed," are properly the words
of contract, stipulating for some future legislative act; they are not
necessarily so. They may import that they "shall be ratified and
confirmed" by force of the instrument itself. When we observe, that
in the counterpart of the same treaty, executed at the same time, by
the same parties, they are used in this sense, we think the
construction proper, if not unavoidable. 3
In short, under the English version of the treaty the provision appears to
be executory, because it seems to promise future performance.
However, when viewed together with the Spanish version, it is clear that
article 8 is executed, not executory, because it promises immediate
performance.
It bears emphasis that, in Chief Justice Marshall's view, as articulated
in Foster and Percheman, the classification of a treaty provision as
executed or executory turns exclusively on the nature of the international
legal obligation embodied in the treaty. Marshall assumed that different
domestic legal consequences would flow from different types of treaty
obligations. Thus, for example, an executed treaty provision "operates of
itself without the aid of any legislative provision." 4 In contrast, "the
legislature must execute" an executory treaty provision "before it can
become a rule for the Court."8 However, the sole criterion for
distinguishing between executory and executed treaty provisions is the
nature of the international legal obligation. If the treaty requires
immediate performance, as a matter of international law, it is executed.
A treaty provision is executory if, as a matter of international law, it
obligates a party to accomplish a result in the future, some time after
entry into force of the treaty, but neither requires nor prohibits any
particular action immediately upon entry into force.
2. Subsequent Nineteenth Century Decisions
Commentators have generally understood Foster and Percheman to
distinguish between treaty provisions that have no domestic legal effect
in the absence of implementing legislation (non-self-executing) and
Id. at 89.
Foster, 27 U.S. at 314-15.
Id. at 314.
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provisions that do have domestic legal effect, even without
86implementing legislation (self-executing). In contrast, the preceding
analysis emphasizes the distinction between a treaty provision that
promises to convey property in the future (executory) and a treaty
provision that itself conveys property (executed). This analysis is
supported by subsequent nineteenth century Supreme Court decisions
that construed Foster and Percheman in accordance with the
executory /executed distinction.
For example, in Rhode Island v. Massachusetts," Justice Baldwin stated
that the Court in Foster "distinctly recognized the distinction between an
executory treaty.., and an executed treaty."88 Justice Baldwin described
an executory treaty as "a mere stipulation for the future confirmation of
previous grants .... " 89 In contrast, an executed treaty is "a present
confirmation, absolute and final by the mere force of the treaty itself."90
In Justice Baldwin's view, the key holding of Percheman was that article 8
of the 1819 treaty with Spain "was an executed treaty [provision]"
because it "operated as a perfect, present, and absolute confirmation
of... [land] grants." 9 Thus, according to Justice Baldwin, the key
distinction recognized in Foster and Percheman is the distinction between
a treaty provision that promises to convey property in the future
(executory) and a treaty provision that itself conveys property
(executed).
Similarly, in Guitard v. Stoddard, plaintiff's counsel noted that "the
English version of the Florida treaty.., was construed to be executory"
in Foster, but "the Spanish version of the same clause of the same
treaty... [was] held to be a present ratification and confirmation" in
92Percheman. Guitard is particularly noteworthy because a key issue in
that case was whether an 1812 Act of Congress was executory or
executed.93 The fact that the court distinguished between executory and
See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 8, at 198-200; Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, supra note 4,
at 767; Viizquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 10, at 700-02.
37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657 (1838).
Id. at 746.
Id.
Id.
91 Id. at 747. Justice Baldwin actually thought that United States v. Arredondo, 31 U.S. (6
Pet.) 691 (1832), which was decided after Foster and before Percheman, had implicitly held
that article 8 of the 1819 treaty with Spain was executed, not executory. Percheman, he said,
"on considering the necessary effect of this construction [in Arredondo], repudiated that
which had been given" in Foster. Rhode Island, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 747.
9' Guitard v. Stoddard, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 494, 501 (1853).
9' See id. at 508-11.
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executed statutes shows that the executory/executed distinction, as
conceived in the nineteenth century, did not turn on whether legislation
was required for a treaty (or statute) to become law.94  Rather, the
distinction turned on whether a particular law was a "present operative
grant."95
3. Foster and The Intent Thesis
Marshall's distinction between executory and executed treaty
provisions turned entirely on the nature of the international legal
obligation. Nowhere in Foster or Percheman did Chief Justice Marshall
state or imply that the parties' intentions have a direct effect,
independent of the nature of the international legal obligation imposed
by the treaty, on the domestic legal consequences of treaty ratification.
Therefore, Foster and Percheman do not support either direct version of
the intent thesis.
However, Foster does support the indirect remedial version of the
intent thesis because it suggests that executory treaty provisions cannot
be enforced by the judiciary until they are executed. In Chief Justice
Marshall's words: "But when the terms of the stipulation import a
contract when either of the parties engages to perform a particular act,
the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department;
and the legislature must execute the contract, before it can become a rule
for the Court."96 The first part of this sentence refers to treaty provisions
that are executory as a matter of international law. The second part
describes the domestic legal effects of ratification of an executory
provision: such provisions are not judicially enforceable until they are
"executed."
Notwithstanding Marshall's statement that the "legislature must
execute the contract, 97 Foster should not be construed to mean that all
executory provisions must be executed by the legislature. Whether
legislation is required depends upon the nature of the obligation.99 If a
' See also Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 291 (1821) (distinguishing
between "self executed" and "executory" constitutional provisions); Beecher v. Wetherby,
95 U.S. 517, 521 (1877) (noting contention of counsel that 1846 statute "did not constitute a
present grant, but was in the nature of an executory agreement").
5 Guitard, 57 U.S. at 508.
Foster, 27 U.S. at 314.
I d.
" See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 272-73 (1796) (distinguishing among three
classes of executory treaty provisions that require "execution," respectively, by legislative,
executive, or judicial branch).
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treaty specifies a date certain for future performance, then it is
"executed" by passage of time.9  On the other hand, if a treaty obligates
the United States to take unspecified steps toward achieving an agreed
objective at an unspecified future time1° - as in Marshall's construction
of article 8 in Foster - then action by the political branches is necessary
to execute the treaty.101
B. The Indirect Remedial Version of the Intent Thesis (Foster Doctrine)
The indirect remedial version of the intent thesis (Foster doctrine)
holds that the treaty makers' intent indirectly affects the availability of
judicial remedies for treaty violations."2 Application of the Foster
doctrine requires a two-step analysis. In step one, the treaty makers'
intentions are relevant because the court is construing a question of
international law: the nature and scope of the international treaty
obligation. In step two, though, the treaty makers' intentions are
See infra notes 107-112 and accompanying text.
" See infra note 111.
In Foster, legislation was required because Congress was the only body with the
domestic legal authority to carry out the promise to convey property in the future. Other
types of treaty provisions promise future action that can be carried out by the executive
branch. Whether an executory provision requires legislative implementation, or executive
implementation, depends upon which actor(s) have the requisite authority under domestic
law to perform the promised action.
"02 The Foster doctrine corresponds roughly to what Professor VAzquez calls the
"justiciability" doctrine. See Vizquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 10, at 710-18. However,
there are three significant differences between VAzquez' "justiciability doctrine" and what
this article calls the "Foster doctrine."
First, Vizquez' interpretation of Foster closely resembles the Restatement doctrine,
see id. at 700-04, whereas this article treats Foster as the progenitor of the Foster doctrine.
For my analysis of V~zquez' interpretation of Foster see infra notes 279-295 and
accompanying text.
Second, Vizquez' justiciability analysis focuses on precatory and indeterminate
treaty provisions as exemplars of the types of treaty provisions that are not judicially
enforceable. See id. at 712-15. This author agrees with Profess Vizquez' discussion of
precatory and indeterminate treaty provisions. However, his presentation of the
"justiciability doctrine" is underinclusive because it fails to mention executory and
horizontal treaty provisions. With respect to executory and horizontal provisions see infra
notes 107-125 and accompanying text.
Third, and most importantly, Vdzquez analogizes the justiciability doctrine to the
political question doctrine. See id. at 715-16; Vizquez, Laughing, supra note 17, at 2180. In
doing so, Professor Vzquez blurs the critical distinction between the Foster doctrine and
the Carter doctrine. The Foster doctrine's limits on judicial enforcement are linked to the
nature of the international legal obligation. In contrast, the Carter doctrine's limits on
judicial enforcement, like some variants of the political question doctrine, derive from the
power of the political branches to regulate the exercise of the judicial function. See infra
Part W.
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irrelevant because the court is making a prudential judgment, in light of
the judiciary's role in our constitutional system, as to whether the treaty
provision at issue is the type of law that is judicially enforceable. Under
the Foster doctrine, there are three types of justifications a court could
offer for refusing to enforce a particular treaty provision: the provision
is indeterminate; it is executory; or it creates only horizontal, not vertical,
duties 03
1. Indeterminate Treaty Provisions
When courts say that a treaty provision is "not self-executing," they
sometimes mean that it is too vague or indeterminate to be judicially
enforceable. 1 4 In federal statutory cases, the Supreme Court has refused
to enforce a statute if it is "so 'vague and amorphous' that its
enforcement would strain judicial competence." 05 Under the rubric of
non-self-execution, numerous courts have refused to enforce treaty
provisions for precisely the same reason.106
2. Executory Treaty Provisions
A treaty provision is executory if, as a matter of international law, it
obligates a party to accomplish a result in the future, some time after
entry into force of the treaty, but neither requires nor prohibits any
particular action immediately upon entry into force. The distinction
between executory and executed provisions can be illustrated by
reference to the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.0 7 Article 6 of
the treaty obligates the parties not to "produce or flight-test any
" A fourth justification, which is similar in some respects, is that a treaty provision is
precatory, not mandatory. See Vdzquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 10, at 712-13. A
precatory provision, by definition, does not create any primary international duty. The
Supremacy Clause converts into domestic law only what exists as a matter of international
law, and nothing more. Thus, precatory treaty provisions do not create primary domestic
duties because they do not create primary international duties. Therefore, precatory treaty
provisions differ from indeterminate, executory and horizontal provisions in that they do
not create primary domestic law. See, e.g., INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 428 n. 22 (1984)
(stating that "the language of article 34 [of the Protocol on the Status of Refugees] was
precatory and not self-executing").
"' See Vizquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 10, at 713-15.
Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997). See also Wilder v. Va. Hosp.
Assoc., 496 U.S. 498, 509 (1990); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 599 (1988).
" See Vizquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 10, at 713-15.
" Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, Dec. 8,
1987, U.S.-U.S.S.R., S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-11 (1988) [hereinafter INF Treaty].
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intermediate-range missiles.",1 8  This provision is "executed," not
"executory," because it applies "[ulpon entry into force of this Treaty
and thereafter."1'9 In contrast, article 4 obligates each party to "eliminate
all its intermediate-range missiles... so that no later than three years
after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter no such missiles...
shall be possessed by either Party."" Article 4 is executory because it
creates an international legal obligation to achieve a result in the future;
it does not create an international legal obligation for the parties to
perform (or refrain from performing) a specific action immediately upon
entry into force of the treaty.
There is a close relationship between executory and indeterminate
treaty provisions. Although article 4 states precisely what must be
accomplished at the end of three years, it is indeterminate with respect to
the specific steps that must be taken during the initial three year period.
It is characteristic of executory treaty provisions that they can also be
described as indeterminate (or precatory) before the deadline by which
the future result is required to be accomplished."' This is why courts
often link these concepts.1
2
Statutes, like treaties, can also be executory. As the First Circuit noted
almost one hundred years ago:
[T]here is no practical distinction whatever as between a statute and
a treaty with regard to its becoming presently effective, without
awaiting further legislation. A statute may be so framed as to make
it apparent that it does not become practically effective until
something further is done .... The same may be said with regard to
a treaty. Both statutes and treaties become presently effective when
Id., art. VI, para. l(a).
Id., art. VI, para. 1. More broadly, treaty provisions that prohibit specified conduct
are usually executed, not executory.
I1 d., art. IV, para. 1.
Ill Some executory treaty provisions do not specify a time period within which the
desired result is to be accomplished. See, e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 2, para. 1, 999 U.N.T.S. 3 ("Each State Party to the
present Covenant undertakes to take steps ... to the maximum of its available resources,
with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the
present Covenant..."). In such cases, the provision remains precatory and indeterminate
for the indefinite future. In contrast, provisions like Article IV of the INF Treaty become
mandatory and determinate at the end of the specified time period - that is, when
executed.
112 See, e.g., Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617, 619-22 (Cal. 1952) (holding that human rights
provisions of U.N. Charter are non-self-executing because they are precatory,
indeterminate, and executory).
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their purposes are expressed as presently effective.11 3
Executory treaty and statutory provisions are not judicially enforceable
until they are "executed" because they do not create any determinate
duties until they are executed.
However, it is a grave mistake - which courts repeat all too
frequently - to conclude that a treaty provision is not immediately
effective, and therefore executory, merely because it uses the word
"shall. 1 1 4 Ordinarily, usage of the word "shall" in treaties should be
understood to mean that the provision is mandatory, not executory,
unless other language in the treaty clearly indicates that the drafters
intended that that particular provision would not be immediately
effective (as a matter of international law) upon entry into force of the
treaty.
3. Horizontal Treaty Provisions
In the Head Money Cases,'15 the Supreme Court distinguished between
116
"horizontal" and "vertical" treaty provisions. A horizontal provision
creates a duty that one nation owes to another nation; it "is primarily a
compact between independent nations."1 1 7 In contrast, vertical treatyS 118
provisions create duties that are owed to private parties.
Vertical treaty provisions "are capable of enforcement as between
private parties in the courts of the country." 9  Horizontal treaty
provisions, though, are not judicially enforceable at the behest of private
parties.'20 Horizontal duties do not create primary rights for individuals,
", United Shoe Mach. Co. v. Duplessis Shoe Mach. Co., 155 F. 842, 845 (1st Cir. 1907).
1' In Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314-16 (1829), Chief Justice Marshall made the
mistake of construing the word "shall" to imply that a treaty provision was executory.
Four years later, though, he corrected this mistake. See United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S.
(7 Pet.) 51, 89 (1833).
,' Edye v. Robertson (Head Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
.16 The court in Head Money Cases did not actually use the terms "horizontal" and
"vertical." My usage of the terms is adapted from an article by Professor Brilmayer. See
Lea Brilmayer, International Law in American Courts: A Modest Proposal, 100 YALE L.J. 2277
(1991).
17 Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 598.
Id. (referring to treaty provisions that "confer certain rights upon the citizens or
subjects of one of the nations residing in the territorial limits of the other").
119 Id.
120 Id. (stating that a horizontal provision "depends for [its] enforcement... on the
interest and the honor of the governments which are parties to it. If these fail, its infraction
becomes the subject of international negotiations and reclamations, so far as the injured
party chooses to seek redress, which may in the end be enforced by actual war. It is
obvious that with all this the judicial courts have nothing to do and can give no redress.").
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because a right is "the mere obverse of" a duty,12 1 and horizontal duties
are owed to nations, not individuals. If an individual lacks a primary
right under a treaty, a court will not enforce the treaty at the behest of
that individual. Horizontal treaty provisions are analogous to federal
statutes that merely regulate relationships between different Executive
Branch agencies but that do not purport to regulate the conduct of
private actors.122 If a statute creates a duty that one government agency
owes to another government agency, it is not judicially enforceable at the
behest of individuals because it does not create primary rights for
individuals.
In some cases, the distinction between horizontal and vertical treaty
provisions may be relatively easy to apply. In other cases, the distinction
may be much more difficult to apply. In every case, though, the
question whether a duty is owed to a private party, or solely to another
nation, concerns the nature of the international legal obligation the treaty
creates. The fact that courts will enforce vertical, but not horizontal,
treaty provisions at the behest of private parties is a domestic legal
consequence that results from the nature of the international legal
obligation.
Although the Supremacy Clause states that "judges in every State shall
be bound" by treaties, the limitations on judicial enforcement of
treaties embodied in the Foster doctrine are fully consistent with the
Supremacy Clause. Those limitations are rooted in separation of powers
principles that preclude judges from enforcing laws that, by their nature,
are not appropriate for judicial enforcement.1 The same separation of
See also Woolhandler, supra note 10, at 782-85 (contending that "broad nation-to-nation
treaty obligations" should be considered non-justiciable).
2 HART & SACKS, supra note 38, at 153.
For example, a recent statute abolishing three independent agencies and transferring
their functions to the Department of State would not be judicially enforceable in an action
between private parties because it does not create a duty that is owed to a private party.
See Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, Division G,
112 Stat. 2681-761 (1998) (abolishing United States Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, United States Information Agency, and International Development Cooperation
Agency, and transferring their functions to Department of State).
" Courts have done very little to develop practical criteria for distinguishing between
horizontal and vertical treaty provisions. For scholarly views on this issue, see Brilmayer,
supra note 116, at 2302-06; see also Vizquez, Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 47, at 1134-41.
124 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
2 Horizontal treaty provisions differ from indeterminate and executory provisions in
that indeterminate and executory provisions are not judicially enforceable by anyone. In
contrast, although horizontal provisions are not judicially enforceable by private parties,
they may, in principle, be enforceable by government entities, both domestically and
internationally.
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powers principles preclude judges from enforcing indeterminate,
executory, and horizontal federal statutes. Inasmuch as separation of
powers limitations on the judicial enforcement of federal statutes are
consistent with the Supremacy Clause, comparable limitations on the
judicial enforcement of treaties are equally consistent with the
Supremacy Clause.
III. THE WHITNEY DOCTRINE
Under the Whitney doctrine, non-self-executing treaty provisions are
not automatically converted into primary domestic law at the time the
treaty is ratified. The Whitney doctrine differs from the Foster doctrine in
that Whitney embodies a primary law concept of non-self-execution,
whereas Foster reflects a remedial law concept. The Whitney doctrine
differs from the Restatement doctrine because Whitney limits automatic
conversion only of certain types of international legal obligations: those
that, by their nature, are beyond the scope of the treaty makers' domestic
lawmaking power. In contrast, the Restatement doctrine limits
automatic conversion of all types of international legal obligations,
including those within the scope of the treaty makers' domestic
lawmaking power, provided that the treaty makers have manifested an
intent to preclude automatic conversion.
Part III has two sections. The first section explains the conceptual
relationship between the intent thesis, the Whitney doctrine and the
Supremacy Clause. The second section demonstrates that the concept of
self-execution employed by the Supreme Court in Whitney v. Robertson
126
is best understood in terms of the Whitney doctrine.
A. The Indirect Primary Version of the Intent Thesis (Whitney Doctrine)
The indirect primary version of the intent thesis (Whitney doctrine)
holds that the treaty makers' intent indirectly affects the automatic
127conversion of primary international law into primary domestic law.
Application of the Whitney doctrine requires a two-step analysis. In step
one, the treaty makers' intentions are relevant because the court is
construing a question of international law: the nature and scope of the
international legal rules embodied in a treaty. In step two, though, the
,2 124 U.S. 190 (1888).
The Whitney doctrine corresponds roughly to what Professor V~zquez calls the
"constitutionality" doctrine of self-execution. See Vzquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 10, at
718-19.
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treaty makers' intentions are irrelevant because the court is construing a
question of domestic constitutional law: whether the Constitution
precludes automatic conversion of a particular international legal rule
into domestic law.
The second step of the analysis presupposes a rule of constitutional
law. A treaty that conflicts with the Constitution has no domestic legal
force because the Constitution takes precedence over a treaty. 12 Broadly
speaking, there are three types of constitutional limitations on the
automatic conversion of international treaty law into primary domestic
law. First, a treaty cannot deprive a U.S. citizen of his or her
constitutionally protected individual ri hts.129 Second, the treaty power
is subject to federalism limitations. Third, in accordance with
separation of powers principles, the Supremacy Clause cannot
automatically convert a treaty provision into primary domestic law "if
the agreement would achieve what lies within the exclusive law-making
power of Congress under the Constitution."
131
" The Supreme Court stated in dicta at least as early as 1853 that the treaty power
cannot be exercised in a manner that violates constitutional rights. See Doe v. Braden, 57
U.S. (16 How.) 635, 656 (1853); see also The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 620-21
(1870).
"2 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1957).
In Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), the Supreme Court held, in effect, that
the treaty power is not subject to exactly the same federalism limitations as are Congress'
legislative powers. The continued vitality of Missouri has recently been a subject of
extensive academic commentary. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American
Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390 (1998); Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American
Federalism, Part II, 99 MICH. L. REV. 98 (2000); Martin S. Flaherty, Are We to Be a Nation?:
Federal Power vs. "States' Rights" in Foreign Affairs, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1277 (1999); David M.
Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist Conception
of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075 (2000); Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism,
70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1223 (1999); Carlos Manuel Vizquez, Breard, Printz, and the Treaty
Power, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1317 (1999). But even the staunchest defenders of Missouri agree
that the case did not abolish all federalism limitations on the Treaty Power, and that there
is a protected sphere of states' rights into which the treaty power cannot intrude. See
Golove, supra, at 1085 (stating that "treaties are not immune from federalism limitations,
and nothing in Missouri suggests the contrary"); see also HENKIN, supra note 8, at 193.
,I" RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 111 cmt. i (1987). Some of Congress'
legislative powers are "concurrent" powers; domestic law within the scope of Congress'
concurrent powers can be made either by legislation, or by means of the treaty power. In
contrast, other Congressional powers are "exclusive" powers. The treaty makers cannot
make domestic law within the scope of Congress' exclusive powers; such law can be made
only by legislation. See id.; see also infra notes 215-219 and accompanying text. There is a
wide range of scholarly views concerning the proper line of demarcation between
concurrent and exclusive powers. At one extreme, Professor Yoo contends (as one of two
alternative theses) that all of Congress' Article I powers are exclusive powers. See Yoo,
Rejoinder, supra note 3, at 2220. At the other extreme, Professor Paust contends that
virtually all of Congress' legislative powers are concurrent powers. See JORDAN PAUST,
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The Whitney doctrine is consistent with the text of the Supremacy
Clause. The Clause acknowledges the constitutional limits on the treaty
makers' power to create primary domestic law by specifying that treaties
are the "supreme Law of the Land" only if they are "made... under the
authority of the United States."132 The plain meaning of this phrase is
that primary international legal rules embodied in a treaty cannot be
automatically converted into domestic law if automatic conversion
would be inconsistent with the constitutional limits on the treaty makers'
133
authority to create primary domestic law. Thus, treaty provisions that
infringe upon constitutionally protected individual rights or states'
rights, or that encroach upon Congress' exclusive lawmaking powers,
are not made "under the authority of the United States," at least not for
purposes of domestic law.TM
B. The Supreme Court's Decision in Whitney
Not until 1887, almost sixty years after Foster, did the Supreme Court
first use the adjective "self-executing" to modify the word "treaty." 135
One year later, in Whitney v. Robertson, the Court defined "self-
executing" to mean that treaty provisions "require no legislation to make
them operative."1' Whitney is an important decision in the evolution of
self-execution doctrine because it was the first Supreme Court decision to
define the term "self-executing," as applied to treaties.
The Court in Whitney clearly employed a primary law concept of self-
execution, because the Court said that only self-executing treaties "have
the force and effect of a legislative enactment." 13 7 Although Whitney
defined "self-executing" to mean that a treaty requires no legislation to
make it operative, Whitney did not explicitly identify criteria for
determining whether a treaty requires legislation. Even so, careful
analysis of the Court's decision demonstrates that the Court understood
INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 59-62 (1996). This article does not
attempt to resolve that issue.
"' U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
See infra notes 210-219 and accompanying text.
134 As a matter of international law, a state is bound by an agreement if the negotiators
had "apparent authority" to conclude the agreement. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note
6, § 311 n. 4. Thus, it is possible that a treaty could be binding internationally, but not
domestically. Professor Henkin argues that this is unlikely. See HENKIN, supra note 8, at
187-88.
3 Bartram v. Robertson, 122 U.S. 116, 120 (1887).
Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
,37 Id.
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the self-execution issue in accordance with the Whitney doctrine.
In Whitney, the plaintiffs brought suit to recover duties paid on sugar
imported from the Dominican Republic."3 The defendant customs
collector had imposed duties pursuant to an 1870 tariff statute.139
Plaintiffs claimed that the goods should have been admitted duty free.
Their argument rested on the combined effect of two different treaties:
an 1867 treaty between the United States and the Dominican Republic,
and an 1876 treaty between the United States and Hawaii! The
Dominican treaty provided that the U.S. would not impose higher duties
for Dominican imports than for imports of similar articles from other
countries.14 By itself, the Dominican treaty did not entitle plaintiffs to
import Dominican sugar duty free because at the time of the Dominican
treaty there was no treaty or statute that authorized duty free imports of
Hawaiian (or any other) sugar.1 However, the plaintiffs contended that
the 1876 treaty with Hawaii, which provided for duty free imports ofH .. 143
Hawaiian sugar, read together with the 1867 treaty with the Dominican
Republic, which prohibited higher duties for Dominican sugar than for
other sugar, obligated the United States to permit duty free imports of
Dominican sugar. T4
The Court rejected plaintiffs' argument on two grounds. First, the
Court held as a matter of international law that the treaty with the
Dominican Republic merely obligated the United States to refrain from
enacting tariff legislation that discriminated against Dominican imports.
It did not obligate the United States to extend automatically to the
Dominican Republic special tariff reductions, like the duty free provision
in the Hawaiian treaty, granted to other countries in subsequent
treaties. 145 In the alternative, the Court held as a matter of domestic law
that, under the later-in-time rule, even if the treaties did create an
international obligation to permit duty free imports of Dominican sugar,
the 1870 tariff statute, which clearly mandated payment of duties,
superseded the 1867 treaty with the Dominican Republic as a matter of
' Id. at 190-91.
' See id. at 191; see also SAMUEL B. CRANDALL, TREATIES: THEIR MAKING AND
ENFORCEMENT 197 (2d ed. 1916).
" See Whitney, 124 U.S. at 191-92. The treaty between the United States and Hawaii
was signed in 1875, but it did not enter into force until 1876. See CRANDALL, supra note 139,
at 197.
"' See Whitney, 124 U.S. at 192.
142 See CRANDALL, supra note 139, at 197.
143 Bartram v. Robertson, 122 U.S. 116, 118 (1887) (quoting treaty).
'" Whitney, 124 U.S. at 191-92.
145 Id. at 192-93.
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domestic law.'4
At first blush, the Court's later-in-time analysis appears to be seriously
flawed, because the plaintiffs claimed a right to duty free imports under
the 1876 treaty with Hawaii, which should have trumped the 1870
statute under the later-in-time rule.4 7 However, the Court incorporated
a self-execution caveat into the later-in-time rule, stating that when a
treaty 'and a statute "are inconsistent, the one last in date will control the
other, provided the stipulation of the treaty on the subject is self-
executing."' 8 Thus, implicit in the Court's later-in-time analysis is the
assumption that the 1876 treaty with Hawaii did not trump the 1870
statute because the treaty was not self-executing.
The question arises, though, "why was the Hawaiian treaty non-self-
executing?" One possible answer is that the treaty was non-self-
executing because the treaty itself stipulated that it "should not take
effect until a law had been passed by Congress to carry it into
operation."' 49  Although this answer initially appears plausible, it is
ultimately unpersuasive because Congress did enact legislation, in 1876,
to implement the Hawaiian treaty;'15 but the plaintiffs in Whitney did not
import the subject sugar until 1882.1"' Hence, the Whitney Court's
unstated assumption that the treaty with Hawaii was non-self-executing
could not have been based upon the treaty language requiring legislative
implementation because the required legislation had long since been
enacted.
However, there is another explanation that does make sense of the
Whitney Court's implicit assumption that the 1876 Hawaiian treaty was
not self-executing. Because the Constitution states explicitly that "[aIll
Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of
Representatives, and because tariff statutes raise revenue, treaties that
" Id. at 193-95.
'" As Crandall points out, the Court seemed to say that it was provisionally accepting
plaintiffs' international law argument for purposes of the later-in-time analysis. See
CRANDALL, supra note 139, at 197; see also Whitney, 124 U.S. at 193 (stating that,
"independently of" international law considerations, "there is another and complete
answer to the pretensions of the plaintiffs"). Under plaintiffs' argument, there was no
international obligation to permit duty free imports until 1876, when the treaty with
Hawaii entered into force. Therefore, insofar as the Court did provisionally accept the
plaintiffs' international law argument for purposes of the later-in-time analysis, that
argument would support the conclusion that the 1876 treaty trumped the earlier statute.
" Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194.
" Bartram v. Robertson, 122 U.S. 116, 119 (1887).
15 Id.
"'1 Whitney, 124 U.S. at 190-91.
112 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
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purport to modify tariff statutes by eliminating statutorily created
import duties, including the 1876 treaty with Hawaii, are necessarily
non-self-executing because they "can [constitutionally] only be enforced
pursuant to legislation to carry them into effect., 15 3 In other words, the
Constitution precludes automatic conversion of any treaty provision that
purports to modify a tariff statute because tariff statutes raise revenue
and the power to raise revenue is an exclusive congressional power.54
Although the Whitney Court did not explicitly hold that the power to set
tariffs is an exclusive congressional power, the Court had ample grounds
for assuming that Congress has exclusive power over tariffs."'
Moreover, the Court's later-in-time analysis strongly suggests that the
Court did make that assumption, because its later-in-time analysis is
otherwise simply unintelligible.
153 Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194 (explaining term "not self-executing"). One might object
that this interpretation of Whitney is flawed for the same reason that the previously rejected
interpretation was flawed. The preceding paragraph rejected the claim that Whitney's
(implicit) non-self-execution holding was based on treaty language requiring legislative
implementation, because the requisite legislation had already been enacted. The same
argument, one might object, applies to the constitutional analysis: the Whitney court's
(implicit) non-self-execution holding cannot be based on the constitutional requirement of
legislative implementation because the requisite legislation had already been enacted.
This objection misses its mark. The key assumption underlying the Court's later-in-
time analysis was the assumption that the treaty with Hawaii, viewed together with the
treaty with the Dominican Republic, created an international legal obligation for the United
States to admit imports of Dominican sugar duty free. See supra notes 138-144 and
accompanying text. Given that assumption, the international obligation to admit imports
of Dominican sugar duty free would have taken effect on September 9, 1876, the date on
which the treaty with Hawaii entered into force. The legislation implementing the treaty
took effect three weeks earlier, on August 15, 1876. 19 Stat. 200, ch. 290 (1876). The
implementing legislation, on its face, said nothing about Dominican sugar; it referred only
to Hawaiian sugar. Id. If the treaty language requiring legislative implementation was the
only obstacle to conversion of treaty obligations into domestic law, then the presumed
international obligation to admit imports of Dominican sugar duty free would have been
domestically effective on September 9, 1876, either because the implementing legislation
must be construed in harmony with the treaty, or because the September 9 treaty trumps
the August 15 statute under the later-in-time rule. However, if there were a constitutional
bar to automatic conversion, then the presumed international obligation to admit sugar
imports duty free would be domestically effective only to the extent that it was codified in
legislation, and as noted above, the August 15 statute was silent with respect to Dominican
sugar.
' See supra note 131 (discussing distinction between concurrent and exclusive powers).
155 Crandall documents the fact that, through a series of steps over the first half of the
nineteenth century, the Senate and House had, at least by 1854, worked out a tacit
understanding that treaties involving concessions in tariff duties would not enter into force
- either domestically or internationally - until after Congress had enacted implementing
legislation. See CRANDALL, supra note 139, at 183-99. It is likely that the Whitney Court was
aware of this tacit understanding.
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In sum, the best explanation of the Court's decision in Whitney is that
the Court thought the 1876 Hawaiian treaty was non-self-executing
because it created an international obligation to modify U.S. tariff
statutes, and the Constitution precludes automatic conversion of a treaty
obligation to modify tariff statutes. This explanation is consistent with
the Whitney doctrine, which focuses on the constitutional limits on the
treaty makers' power to create primary domestic law by means of
treaties.
IV. THE CARTER DOCTRINE
The direct remedial version of the intent thesis (Carter .doctrine) holds
that the treaty makers' intent directly controls the availability of
domestic judicial remedies for treaty violations. As such, the Carter
doctrine presupposes that the treaty makers have the power to limit the
availability of domestic judicial remedies without modifying the primary
international legal obligations embodied in a treaty. The Carter doctrine
differs from the Restatement doctrine in that the Carter doctrine
embodies a remedial law concept of non-self-execution, whereas the
Restatement doctrine reflects a primary law concept. The Carter doctrine
differs from the Foster doctrine because the Carter doctrine purports to
limit judicial enforcement of all types of international legal obligations,
including those that the judiciary is competent to enforce, provided that
the treaty makers have manifested an intent to preclude judicial
enforcement.
The Carter doctrine relates to the treaty makers' practice of attaching
non-self-executing declarations ("NSE declarations") to treaties.156 That
practice originated in 1978 when President Carter submitted four human
1157
rights treaties to the Senate. Since that time, the United States has
adopted NSE declarations for five treaties."' The Senate Foreign
" An NSE declaration is a declaration adopted unilaterally by the United States at the
time of treaty ratification, stating that the treaty (or some portion thereof) is not self-
executing. In principle, this article's analysis of NSE declarations would apply equally to a
bilateral or multilateral treaty provision stating that some or all of the treaty is not self-
executing. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text (contending that distinction
between bilateral and unilateral intent is not significant). However, to the best of this
author's knowledge, there are no such bilateral or multilateral treaty provisions. Therefore,
the analysis in Part W focuses on the NSE declarations adopted unilaterally by the United
States.
'57 See MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING FOUR
TREATIES PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS, S. EXEC. Docs. C- F, 95-2, at vi (1978) [hereinafter
CARTER MESSAGE].
1-5 See 146 CONG. REC. S8866 (2000) (Senate resolution of ratification for Convention
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Relations Committee has recommended an NSE declaration for a sixth
treaty that has not yet been approved by the full Senate.5 9 The Senate
record associated with treaty ratification makes clear that the President
and Senate did not intend, by means of the NSE declarations, to modify
the United States' international legal obligations under the treaties.'9
Therefore, this Article assumes that the NSE declarations were intended
to shape domestic law directly - that is, without affecting the United
States' international legal obligations. 61
Several commentators have contended that the NSE declarations
162adopted by the United States are invalid. Others have defended the
(No. 176) Concerning Safety and Health in Mines, June 22, 1995, S. TREATY Doc. NO. 106-8
(1999)); 146 CONG. REC. S8867 (2000) (Senate resolution of ratification for Convention on
Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, May 29, 1993,
S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-51 (1998)); 140 CONG. REC. S7634-35 (1994) (Senate resolution of
ratification for International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195); 138 CONG. REC. S4783-
84 (1992) (Senate resolution of ratification for ICCPR, supra note 66); 136 CONG. REC.
S17491-92 (1990) (Senate resolution of ratification for Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Feb. 4,
1985, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 23 I.L.M. 1027).
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13. For the proposed NSE declaration see S.
EXEC. REP. No. 103-38, at 52 (1994). Congress has also included non-self-executing
declarations in implementing legislation for treaties. See, e.g., Berne Convention
Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 2, 102 Stat. 2853, 2853 (1988). In
addition, statutes implementing certain trade agreements include language that may be
functionally equivalent to NSE declarations, depending upon how those declarations are
interpreted. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 3512(c)(1) (relating to Uruguay Round Agreements).
"o See, e.g., SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL
CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, S. EXEC. REP.
No. 103-29, at 26 (1994) [hereinafter RACE REPORT] ("Declaring the Convention to be non-
self-executing in no way lessens the obligation of the United States to comply with its
provisions as a matter of international law.").
61 The NSE declarations are intended to limit the availability of judicial remedies for
treaty violations, without affecting a treaty's status as primary domestic law. See infra notes
166-169 and accompanying text. Hence, those declarations are properly analyzed under
the direct remedial version of the intent thesis, not the direct primary version.
62 See, e.g., Thomas Buergenthal, Modern Constitutions and Human Rights Treaties, 36
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 211, 221 (1997) (questioning constitutionality of NSE
declarations); Malvina Halberstam, United States Ratification of the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 31 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON.
49, 64-70 (1997) (challenging validity of NSE declarations on constitutional grounds); Paust,
Customary International Law, supra note 4, at 324-25 (claiming that NSE declarations are
"unconstitutional and void under the Supremacy Clause"); see also Louis Henkin, U.S.
Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341,
346 (1995) (stating that NSE declarations are "against the spirit of the Constitution" and
"may be unconstitutional").
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NSE declarations1 3 Part IV contends that the validity of the NSE
declarations depends upon their meaning. Part IV distinguishes among
three possible interpretations of the NSE declarations. First, the
declarations might mean that the subject treaties do not create primary
domestic law. Second, the declarations might mean that the subject
treaties are not judicially enforceable, even though they do create
primary domestic law. Third, the declarations might mean only that the
treaties do not create a private cause of action. T6 Part IV analyzes the
validity of the NSE declarations separately under each interpretation.
The analysis sheds light on the scope of the treaty makers' power to
control directly the availability of domestic judicial remedies for treaty
violations.
A. NSE Declarations Mean that Treaties are not Primary Domestic Law
One possible interpretation of the NSE declarations is that the treaties
to which they are attached do not create primary domestic law. Under
this interpretation, the NSE declarations would be invalid, because the
NSE declarations are not intended to have any international legal effect,
and the treaty makers lack the power to adopt provisions that deprive a
treaty of its constitutional status as primary domestic law without
affecting international law.
However, this interpretation of the NSE declarations is plainly
incorrect. As noted above, the United States has adopted NSE
declarations for only five treaties, and the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee has recommended an NSE declaration for one other treaty.166
A search of the Senate record associated with those six treaties reveals
only two rather ambiguous statements by government officials that
167
appear to support this interpretation of the NSE declarations. In
contrast, there are many statements by government officials supporting
161 See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional
Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 419-23, 446-51 (2000).
" The distinction here among three possible interpretations of the NSE declarations
tracks my analysis in a previous article. See Sloss, supra note 62, at 1120-23.
' See infra Part V.
16 See supra notes 158-159.
167 See CARTER MESSAGE, supra note 157, at vi ("[Dieclarations that the treaties are not
self-executing are recommended. With such declarations, the substantive provisions of the
treaties would not of themselves become effective as domestic law."); SENATE COMM. ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL,
INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 101-30, at 12
(1990) (stating that NSE declaration is "recommended to clarify that the provisions of the
Convention would not of themselves become effective as domestic law").
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the proposition that the treaties are the Law of the Land,
notwithstanding the NSE declarations. Moreover, every U.S. court that
has explicitly addressed the issue agrees that the treaties to which NSE
declarations are attached are the Law of the Land, notwithstanding the
NSE declarations.9 Therefore, the NSE declarations do not mean that
the subject treaties lack the status of primary domestic law.
B. NSE Declarations Mean that Treaties are not Judicially Enforceable
One could construe the NSE declarations to mean that the treaties to
which they are attached are not judicially enforceable, regardless of
whether the treaty is invoked offensively or defensively, and regardless
of whether the case is litigated in state or federal court. Under this
interpretation, the NSE declarations manifest the treaty makers' intent to
preclude judges in U.S. courts from applying the treaties as a rule of
decision17° in cases where litigants raise treaty-based claims or defenses,
" See, e.g., International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination: Hearing Before the Comm. On Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 103d Cong. 20
(1994) [hereinafter Race Hearing] (stating that Race Convention "has the same status [as a
federal statute] under our constitutional scheme" and that "a duly ratified treaty will
supercede prior inconsistent federal law"); id. at 18 ("Under Article VI, Clause 2 of the
Constitution, duly ratified treaties become the supreme law of the land, equivalent to a
federal statute."); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Hearing Before the
Comm. on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 102d Cong. 80 (1992) [hereinafter ICCPR Hearing]
("Under the Supremacy Clause, ratified treaties are the law of the land, equivalent to
federal statutes.... Consequently, properly ratified treaties can and do supersede
inconsistent domestic law."); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Hearing Before the Comm. On Foreign Relations, U.S.
Senate, 101st Cong. 42 (1990) (stating that, after ratification, treaty "would be part of
domestic law. If you adopt this treaty, it is not just international law. The standard
becomes part of our law."). For additional analysis of the Senate record, see Sloss, supra
note 67, at 152-71.
1" See United States v. Duarte-Acero, 208 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2000) (when the
United States became a party to the ICCPR, "the treaty became, coexistent with the United
States Constitution and federal statutes, the supreme law of the land"); United States v.
Duarte-Acero, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1040 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (stating that ICCPR "is the
supreme law of the land"); Maria v. McElroy, 68 F. Supp. 2d 206, 231-32 (E.D.N.Y. 1999)
("Although the ICCPR is not self-executing, it is an international obligation of the United
States and constitutes a law of the land."); United States v. Benitez, 28 F. Supp. 2d 1361,
1363 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (stating that ICCPR "is the supreme law of the land"); State v.
Carpenter, 69 S.W.3d 568, 578 (Tenn. 2001) (stating that ICCPR "is the supreme law of the
land").
17 In some cases, courts apply treaties as a guide to interpretation of other provisions of
law, but they apply those other legal provisions as the rule of decision in the case. See, e.g.,
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880-85 (2d Cir. 1980) (examining treaties and other
sources to establish existence of rule of customary international law). Under the
interpretation suggested here, the NSE declarations would not preclude reliance on treaties
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even if the treaty provision at issue is, by its nature, judicially
enforceable. There are many statements in the Senate record associated
with ratification of the subject treaties that appear to support this
interpretation. 171 Additionally, there are some,)udicial opinions that
support the "no judicial remedies" interpretation.
The "no judicial remedies" interpretation raises the question whether,
and to what extent, the treaty makers have the power to preclude U.S.
courts from applying a treaty provision that is the Law of the Land, and
that is, by its nature, judicially enforceable. Detailed analysis of that
question is beyond the scope of this Article. 73 However, the following
two examples will serve to illustrate the range of possibilities. Both
examples assume, for the sake of argument, that the "no judicial
remedies" interpretation is the correct interpretation of the NSE
declarations. 174
1. Plaintiffs in Federal Court
Assume that a plaintiff in a federal civil action raises a treaty-based
claim and that the court does not have diversity jurisdiction. To invoke
the court's federal question jurisdiction,'75 the plaintiff must establish a
in this manner.
171 See, e.g., S. TREATY Doc. No. 106-8, available in 1995 WL 1782223, at *20 (stating that
Convention (No. 176) concerning Safety and Health in Mines "is a non-self-executing
treaty. As such, it would not, if ratified, become directly enforceable as U.S. law in U.S.
courts."); ICCPR Hearing, supra note 168, at 18 (stating that NSE declaration means "that
the ICCPR provisions, when ratified, will not by themselves create private rights
enforceable in U.S. courts"); International Human Rights Treaties: Hearings Before the Comm.
on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 96th Cong. 314-15 (1979) ("A treaty provision that is non-
self-executing may not be enforced directly by the courts, but rather requires implementing
legislation.").
" See, e.g., Beazley v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 248, 267 (5th Cir. 2001) (construing NSE
declaration attached to ICCPR to mean "that absent any further actions by the Congress to
incorporate [treaty] into domestic law, the courts may not enforce" it).
1 Such an analysis would have to address, at a minimum, the following issues: are
there significant differences between treaty-based claims raised by plaintiffs in civil actions
and treaty-based defenses raised by criminal defendants? Are there significant differences
between actions in state courts and federal courts? What is the effect of a treaty provision
that creates an international legal obligation to provide domestic judicial remedies for
treaty violations? Does it matter whether the Senate condition is intended to modify the
United States' international legal obligations under the treaty?
... I have argued elsewhere that this interpretation is not correct. See Sloss, supra note
67; Sloss, supra note 62, at 1118-30. For purposes of this section, though, I will assume that
this is the correct interpretation.
17 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2002) (granting federal district courts jurisdiction over civil actions
"arising under ... treaties").
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federal cause of action.176 If the treaty does not create an express private
right of action,177 the court should refuse to reach the merits of plaintiff's
claim because the NSE declaration is a manifestation of the treaty
makers' intent to deny the plaintiff a federal cause of action.17s
The effectiveness of the NSE declaration, in this context, does not turn
on whether the declaration is part of the treaty. Even assuming that the
NSE declaration is not part of the treaty, 179 it is a manifestation of the
treaty makers' intent to deny the plaintiff a federal cause of action. In
cases where private plaintiffs sue to enforce federal statutory rights, the
Supreme Court has barred judicial remedies for statutory violations if
Congress has manifested its intent to deny plaintiffs a private cause of
action.'s" The principle of judicial deference to the legislature requires
176 Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986); see RICHARD H. FALLON
ET AL., HART & WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 926-37 (4th ed.
1996) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER]. There is a narrow exception permitting federal
question jurisdiction over some claims based on a state law cause of action. See City of
Chicago v. Int'l College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 164 (1997). However, that exception
does not alter the analysis here.
1" If the treaty did create an express private right of action, the court would have to
consider whether the NSE declaration was, in effect, a reservation that eliminated the
private right of action. If the declaration did eliminate the private right of action, it would
preclude judicial remedies. If the declaration did not eliminate the private right of action,
though, one could argue that the court should ignore the NSE declaration on the grounds
that the express private right of action is the Law of the Land under the Supremacy Clause,
whereas the domestic legal status of the NSE declaration is less certain. Several scholars
have made a similar argument. See, e.g., Quigley, supra note 59, at 582-85; Riesenfeld &
Abbott, supra note 59, at 296-97.
" In a different article, I argued that plaintiffs can bring some human rights treaty
claims in federal court, notwithstanding the NSE declarations. See Sloss, supra note 62. I
defended that conclusion by arguing that the treaty makers did not intend, by means of the
NSE declarations attached to human rights treaties, to bar all judicial remedies for human
rights treaty violations in all circumstances. For purposes of this section, though, I am
assuming that the NSE declarations manifest a clear intent to bar all judicial remedies.
" Several scholars have argued that a Senate condition that pertains exclusively to
domestic judicial remedies, and that does not modify the United States' international legal
obligations under a treaty, has no legal effect because it is not part of the treaty. See, e.g.,
Quigley, supra note 59, at 582-85; Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 59, at 296-97. I neither
agree nor disagree with the proposition that such a condition is not part of the treaty.
Rather, I contend that the distinction is irrelevant in the circumstances described herein
because courts are bound to give effect to the intent of the political branches, even if that
intent is not expressed in a manner that gives it the status of law.
" 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a private cause of action that is generally available for
plaintiffs who allege federal statutory violations by state officers. See Sloss, supra note 62, at
1142-48. However, plaintiffs cannot obtain a remedy under section 1983 "where Congress
has foreclosed such enforcement of the statute." Wright v. City of Roanoke Redev. & Hous.
Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423 (1987); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers
Assoc., 453 U.S. 1, 19 (1981). Congressional intent to preclude enforcement under section
1983 need not be explicit; it can be implied from the legislative history. See Middlesex
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courts to respect a political decision to deny plaintiffs a private cause of
action, regardless of whether the legislative intent is embodied in a law,
or merely gleaned from legislative history. Similarly, in treaty cases, the
principle of judicial deference to the treaty makers requires courts to
respect a political decision to deny plaintiffs a private cause of action,
regardless of whether the treaty makers' intent is manifested in treaty
text, or merely gleaned from the Senate record associated with treaty
ratification.
2. Defendants in State Court
Assume that the United States accepts an international treaty
obligation to refrain from imposing capital punishment for crimes
committed by persons below eighteen years of age."' Assume that there
is no constitutional bar to automatic conversion of that international
duty into a primary domestic duty. The ban on capital punishment for
minors is clearly the type of duty that courts are competent to enforce. If
state law permits capital punishment for crimes committed by persons
age sixteen and older, a state seeks to impose capital punishment on a
person who was seventeen when he committed the relevant crime, and
the defendant invokes the treaty as a defense to capital punishment, the
state court would need to decide whether to enforce the treaty.182
The NSE declaration purports to preclude the defendant from
invoking the treaty to invalidate the state law that permits capital
punishment. Even so, the court should ignore the NSE declaration
County, 453 U.S. at 19-21.
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1994), provides a
private cause of action that is generally available for plaintiffs who seek to enjoin federal
statutory violations by federal officers. See Sloss, supra note 62, at 1133-36. However,
plaintiffs cannot obtain judicial review under the APA if a statute gives "clear and
convincing evidence of an intent to withhold" judicial review. Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of
Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 671 (1986) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 79-1980, at 41 (1946)).
181 See ICCPR, supra note 66, art. 6, para. 5 ("Sentence of death shall not be imposed for
crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age..."). When the United States
ratified the ICCPR, it adopted a reservation to exempt itself from this restriction. See 58
Fed. Reg. 45934, 45941 (Aug. 31, 1993); see also Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov.
20, 1989, art. 37, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 ("Neither capital punishment nor life imprisonment
without possibility of release shall be imposed for offences committed by persons below
eighteen years of age."). The United States has signed, but not ratified, the Convention on
the Rights of the Child.
' There are several cases in which state criminal defendants have invoked the ICCPR
in an attempt to preclude the state from imposing capital punishment. See, e.g., Ex parte
Pressley, 770 So. 2d 143 (Ala. 2000); Domingues v. State, 961 P.2d 1279 (Nev. 1998). In these
cases, the defense hinges on an argument that the U.S. reservation is invalid. Courts have
uniformly rejected this argument.
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because the state law is invalid by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, and
the Due Process Clause prevents the state from relying on an invalid law
to impose a criminal sentence. Or, stated somewhat differently, the
NSE declaration is itself invalid insofar as it purports to preclude a
defendant in a state criminal trial from invoking the treaty defensively to
bar the state from meting out punishment pursuant to a state law that
conflicts with the treaty.
Professors Bradley and Goldsmith suggest that the treaty makers can,
by means of an NSE declaration, prevent a treaty from preempting a
conflicting state law.18 4 In support of this proposition, they note that
"Congress frequently specifies that federal statutes do not preempt state
law."1 ' But they fail to recognize the distinction between the concepts of
"field preemption" and "conflict preemption."18 Congress' power to
preempt state law by "occupying a field" is an affirmative power to
displace state laws that do not conflict with federal law. In contrast,
"conflict preemption" is a constitutional conflict of laws principle, rooted
in the Supremacy Clause, that gives federal law priority over conflicting
state laws. When a federal statute specifies that it is not intended to
preempt state law, it is simply clarifying that Congress chose not to
exercise its power of field preemption.189 However, the Supremacy
Clause, by its terms, gives both statutes and treaties priority over
conflicting state laws, and there is no authority for the proposition that
Congress, or the treaty makers, can override the conflict of laws rule
embodied in the Supremacy Clause. Therefore, the treaty makers
cannot, by means of an NSE declaration, prevent a treaty from
invalidating a conflicting state law.9 0
" I know of no case holding explicitly that it would violate due process to sentence a
defendant pursuant to an invalid law. However, the Constitution does prohibit states from
passing any "ex post facto Law." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. The Constitutional ban on
retroactive application of valid criminal laws would be meaningless if states could
circumvent the prohibition by invoking invalid laws as a basis for punishing criminal
defendants.
Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 163, at 446-47.
"8 Id. at 447.
See generally, Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV.
767, 770-73 (1994) (analyzing distinction between "conflict preemption," which he calls
"supremacy," and "field preemption," which he calls simply "preemption").
117 See id. at 771 (defining field preemption) and at 782 (contending that power of field
preemption derives from Necessary and Proper Clause, not Supremacy Clause).
' Id. at 770.
Assuming that the treaty makers have a similar power of field preemption, they
clearly have the option of choosing not to exercise that power.
" Of course, the treaty makers can agree to a treaty provision that incorporates by
[Vol. 36:1
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In one case involving treaty rights, the United States contended, in the
words of one commentator, "that any case implicating a treaty right is,
upon the election of the executive branch, capable of being characterized
as a political question and thus rendered nonjusticiable." 19' This is
essentially a "pure political question" version of the doctrine of non-self-
executing treaties."' Some lower courts have embraced something like a
pure political question version of non-self-execution doctrine. 93 Under
that doctrine, the NSE declaration in the preceding hypothetical would
preclude the state court from reaching the merits of the defendant's
defense against capital sentencing. However, the pure political question
version of non-self-execution doctrine is fundamentally at odds with the
194
rule of law. If the United States is to be "a government of laws, and not
of men,, 9 5 then a state court cannot rely on an invalid law to impose a
sentence on a criminal defendant merely because the treaty makers
expressed their intent to bar judicial review of treaty-based claims and
defenses.
In sum, the treaty makers have the power, by means of NSE
declarations, to preclude federal courts from adjudicating the merits of
plaintiffs' treaty-based claims, at least insofar as the treaty itself does not
create an express private cause of action. However, in cases where a
criminal defendant in state court contends that a state law is invalid
because it conflicts with the treaty, the treaty makers do not have the
power, by means of NSE declarations, to preclude the state court from
adjudicating the merits of such a defense. Therefore, the Carter doctrine
is valid to some degree, but constitutional limitations prevent the treaty
makers from utilizing NSE declarations to bar all judicial remedies for
reference pre-existing statutes as a limitation on the scope of the international obligation,
just as Congress can enact a statute that incorporates by reference pre-existing state law as
a limitation on the scope of the federal statute. See infra note 304 and accompanying text.
But this approach does not merely limit the scope of the domestic law created by a treaty; it
also limits the scope of the international law the treaty creates.
' David J. Bederman, Deference or Deception: Treaty Rights as Political Questions, 70 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1439, 1483 (1999) (describing the argument advanced by the United States in
an amicus brief submitted to the Fourth Circuit in Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d 622 (4th Cir.
1998)).
,92 See Louis Henkin, Is There a Political Question Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 598-99
(1976) (distinguishing between "the ordinary respect of the courts for the political domain,"
and "pure" political question doctrine, which requires "that some issues which prima facie
and by usual criteria would seem to be for the courts, will not be decided by them").
"I See Vdzquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 10, at 715-18 (criticizing the doctrine of non-
self-execution as "free-wheeling abstention").
- See THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS: DOES THE RULE
OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? (1992).
" Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
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treaty violations in all circumstances.
C. NSE Declarations Mean that Treaties do not Create Private Causes of
Action
I have argued elsewhere that the NSE declarations, properly
construed, mean only that the treaties to which these declarations are
attached do not create a private cause of action. There are several
statements in the Senate record that support this interpretation of the
NSE declarations.97 In addition, there are some judicial decisions that
support this interpretation.
The preceding section demonstrated that the treaty makers have the
power, by means of NSE declarations, to preclude federal courts from
adjudicating the merits of plaintiffs' treaty-based claims, even in cases
where plaintiffs seek judicial remedies for violations of treaty provisions
that are, by their nature, judicially enforceable. 19 The greater power to
preclude plaintiffs from raising any treaty-based claims in federal court
clearly includes the lesser power to deny plaintiffs a private cause of
action under a treaty.9 Therefore, if the private cause of action
interpretation is correct, it follows that the NSE declarations are valid
because the treaty makers have the power to decide that a particular
treaty provision will not create a private cause of action.
1" See Sloss, supra note 67; Sloss, supra note 62, at 1118-30.
" See, e.g., Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women:
Hearing Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 103d Cong. 5 (1994) (stating that
intent of proposed NSE declaration "is to clarify that the treaty will not create a new or
independently enforceable private cause of action in U.S. courts"); id. at 12 (same); Race
Hearing, supra note 168, at 18 (same); ICCPR Hearing, supra note 168, at 14 (same); RACE
REPORT, supra note 160, at 25-26 (same); SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 102-23, at 19
(1992) (same).
"' See, e.g., Cornejo-Barreto v. Seifert, 218 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that
fugitive facing extradition who raises claim under article 3 of Torture Convention has right
to judicial review of Secretary of State's decision to extradite); Ralk v. Lincoln County, 81 F.
Supp. 2d 1372 (S.D. Ga. 2000) (holding that alien has right of action under Alien Tort
Claims Act to sue for violations of ICCPR). For analysis of Cornejo-Barreto, see Sloss, supra
note 62, at 1140-41. For analysis of Ralk, see Kristen D.A. Carpenter, The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: A Toothless Tiger?, 26 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 1
(2000).
" See supra notes 175-180 and accompanying text.
"0 The power to deny plaintiffs a private cause of action under a treaty is a "lesser"
power, because a treaty that does not itself create a private cause of action may still be
enforceable by a plaintiff in federal court if that plaintiff invokes a federal statute to
provide a cause of action for judicial enforcement of a substantive treaty right. See Sloss,
supra note 62, at 1130-42.
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V. A CRITIQUE OF THE RESTATEMENT DOCTRINE
Under the direct primary version of the intent thesis (Restatement
doctrine), non-self-executing treaty provisions are not automatically
converted into primary domestic law at the time the treaty is ratified.
The Restatement doctrine differs from the Carter doctrine in that the
Restatement doctrine embodies a primary law concept of non-self-
execution, whereas the Carter doctrine reflects a remedial law concept.
The Restatement doctrine differs from the Whitney doctrine because
Whitney limits automatic conversion only of certain types of international
legal obligations: those that, by their nature, are beyond the scope of the
treaty makers' domestic lawmaking power. In contrast, the Restatement
doctrine limits automatic conversion of all types of international legal
obligations, including those within the scope of the treaty makers'
domestic lawmaking power, provided that the treaty makers have
manifested an intent to preclude automatic conversion.
If the treaty makers lacked the power to preclude automatic
conversion, then their intent to do so would be irrelevant. Thus, the
Restatement doctrine tacitly assumes that the treaty makers have the
power to preclude automatic conversion of any treaty obligation by
stipulating that the treaty shall not have the status of primary domestic
law in the absence of implementing legislation. Therefore, proponents of
the doctrine are forced to find a textual basis for that power in some
provision of the Constitution. The power to decide that a specific treaty
provision is not the supreme Law of the Land cannot be an Article I
power because the Restatement doctrine holds that it is the treaty
makers, not Congress, who have the power to make that decision.201
Therefore, if the treaty makers do have such a power, it must derive
either from their Article II power to make treaties2 2 or from the
Supremacy Clause.
Section A demonstrates that the presumed power to preclude
automatic conversion cannot be rooted in the Supremacy Clause. Section
B contends that Article II should not be construed to give the treaty
makers the power to preclude automatic conversion because that
interpretation of Article II undermines U.S. compliance with its treaty
obligations without advancing any legitimate policy objective. Section C
" Of course, under Article I, Congress does have the power to enact a statute that
supersedes a previously enacted treaty as a matter of domestic law. See, e.g., Whitney v.
Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (if a statute and a treaty "are inconsistent, the one last in
date will control the other").
' U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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addresses the objection that the Restatement doctrine is so deeply
entrenched in judicial precedent that it must be retained.
A. The Plain Meaning of the Supremacy Clause
Many constitutional provisions are so vague that constitutional
analysis quickly moves beyond the text to address structural, historical,
and doctrinal considerations. However, there are some constitutional
questions for which the text provides such a definitive answer that the
Supreme Court has adopted a strict textual approach to constitutional
interpretation. Thus, for example, the Supreme Court held that the line
item veto is unconstitutional,2 3 notwithstanding its endorsement by the
political branches, because it conflicts with the Presentment Clause.2
Similarly, the Court has held that statutes creating a legislative veto
mechanism are also unconstitutional205 because they conflict with the
Presentment Clause and with the constitutional requirement that
legislation must pass both Houses of Congress.
206
This section proceeds from the assumption that the text of the
Supremacy Clause is sufficiently clear that a textual approach to
constitutional analysis is warranted. This does not mean that the text
itself can answer every question pertaining to the status of treaties as
supreme federal law, or even the most interesting questions. However, a
textual analysis demonstrates that certain propositions must be rejected
because they are flatly inconsistent with the text of the Supremacy
Clause. Thus, by rejecting certain possibilities, the textual analysis in
Section A clears the ground for Section B's analysis of structural,
historical, doctrinal, and policy factors.
The Supremacy Clause states, in relevant part, that "all Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall
be the supreme Law of the Land. 2 07 The following analysis contends that
the Clause creates a "qualified automatic conversion rule." Specifically,
the phrase "all Treaties" includes, at a minimum, all treaty provisions
that create primary international legal duties binding on the United
States.20 The phrase "supreme Law of the Land" means that treaty
"3 Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 418 (1998).
204 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, 3.
' INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944-59 (1983).
26 U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 7.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
Hart and Sacks divide primary laws into three categories: primary duties, primary
liberties, and primary powers. HART & SACKS, supra note 38, at 127-130. They define a
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provisions that create primary international duties have the status of
primary domestic law. The phrase "shall be" means that primary treaty
primary duty as "an authoritatively recognized obligation... not to do something, or to do
it, or to do it if at all only in a prescribed way." Id. at 130. They define a primary liberty as
"the absence of a duty." Id. at 132. Finally, they define a primary power as "a capacity...
to effect by a deliberative act a settlement of a question of group living which will be
accepted and enforced by the official representatives of the group." Id. at 133.
International law, like domestic law, creates primary duties, liberties and powers.
For example, the U.N. Charter imposes a primary duty on member states to "refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state." U.N. CHARTER, art. 2(4). But the U.N. Charter also
endows the Security Council with certain primary powers, including, for example, the
power to "take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or
restore international peace and security." Id., art. 42. Finally, the U.N. Charter explicitly
protects certain primary liberties of member states, including "the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence." Id., art. 51.
This Article contends that the Supremacy Clause mandates the conversion of
primary treaty-based international duties into primary domestic duties, subject to
constitutional constraints. There are some cases where the Supremacy Clause also converts
a primary international power or liberty into a primary domestic power or liberty. See, e.g.,
Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523, 526 (1951) (holding that the primary liberties
governed by paragraph 2 of article 2 of the Shipowners' Liability Convention were
"operative by virtue of the general maritime law and that no Act of Congress is necessary
to give them force"). However, there are other cases where it makes no sense to speak of
converting an international power or liberty into domestic law. Consider, for example, the
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income, Oct. 2,
1996, U.S. - Switz., S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-8 (1997). Article 26 requires the Contracting
States to exchange specified information, but paragraph 3 of article 26 provides: "In no case
shall the provisions of this Article be construed so as to impose upon either of the
Contracting States the obligation to... supply particulars which are not procurable under
its own legislation." Id. Thus, paragraph 3 grants the United States a primary international
liberty to withhold certain information. However, paragraph 3 does not grant anyone
within the domestic legal system a primary domestic liberty. The treaty has no impact
whatsoever on Congress' domestic legal authority to enact legislation regulating the
domestic collection of information. Moreover, the Executive Branch's domestic legal
authority to collect information is not affected by the treaty because that authority depends
entirely on domestic legislation. In short, the liberty-creating provision in paragraph 3, by
its nature, has no impact on domestic law. Hence, the qualified automatic conversion rule
applies to primary duties, but it does not necessarily apply in the same way to powers or
liberties.
The distinction between powers, duties and liberties provides the key to
understanding the well-known Power Authority case. Power Authority v. Fed. Power
Comm'n, 247 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir. 1957). In commenting on that case, Professor Henkin
made a persuasive argument that a treaty provision that conferred power on the United
States to divert river water from Niagara Falls did not automatically confer that power on
the Federal Power Commission. See Louis Henkin, The Treaty Makers and the Law Makers:
The Niagara Reservation, 56 COLtUM. L. REV. 1151, 1162-64 (1956). Although the treaty
conferred a primary power on the United States as a matter of international law, the treaty
itself did not confer a primary power on any particular actor within the domestic legal
system. Hence, a political decision by Congress was needed to delegate that power for
domestic purposes.
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duties must be converted into primary domestic law, either by means of
implementing legislation or automatically by the force of the Supremacy
Clause itself. Finally, the phrase "made... under the Authority of the
United States" excludes treaty provisions from the scope of the qualified
automatic conversion rule insofar as the treaty makers lack the
constitutional power to create a particular domestic legal rule by means
209
of the treaty power.
1. Made... Under the Authority of the United States
It is commonly agreed that the treaty makers' power to create primary
domestic law is subject to some constitutional limitations.210 The scope of
those limits need not concern us here. 211 For present purposes, it is
sufficient to note that there are some primary international legal rules
that cannot be automatically converted into primary domestic law by the
force of the Supremacy Clause, either because the federal government as
a whole lacks the power to create such a primary domestic legal rule, or
because the rule falls within the scope of Congress' exclusive legislative
212
authority. The text of the Supremacy Clause acknowledges the
constitutional limits on the treaty makers' power to create primary
domestic law by including the phrase "made... under the authority of
the United States." 213 The plain meaning of this phrase is that primary
international legal rules embodied in a treaty are excluded from the
scope of the qualified automatic conversion rule if automatic conversion
would be inconsistent with the constitutional limits on the treaty makers'
214
authority to create primary domestic law.
For example, suppose that the United States ratifies a treaty that
creates a new international organization and, in that context, creates a
primary international legal duty for the United States to contribute funds
to that organization.2 1 ' The treaty makers have the power to enter into
29 It is well settled that the phrase "made, or which shall be made" was intended to
include treaties made prior to adoption of the Constitution, as well as after its adoption.
See HENKIN, supra note 8, at 186.
21 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 111 cmt. a.
2, See supra notes 128-131 and accompanying text.
212 See supra notes 128-131 and accompanying text.
213 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
214 Accord, Caleb Nelson, The Treaty Power and Self-Execution: A Comment on Professor
Woolhandler's Article, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 801, 807-08 (2002); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD),
supra note 6, § 111(4) (stating that treaty is non-self-executing "if implementing legislation
is constitutionally required").
210 See, e.g., Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production, Stockpiling and
Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for signature Jan. 13, 1993, art.
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such an agreement internationally. Hence, the treaty is "made... under
the authority of the United States" for purposes of international law.216
However, the treaty itself cannot appropriate funds,217 and it is
questionable whether the treaty makers have the constitutional authority
218to create a domestic legal duty for Congress to appropriate funds.
Assuming that the treaty makers cannot create such a domestic legal
duty, the treaty provision requiring a contribution of funds would not be
"made... under the authority of the United States" for purposes of
domestic law, because the treaty makers lack the authority to
appropriate funds themselves, and they lack the authority to compel
Congress to appropriate funds.219
2. All Treaties are Supreme Law of the Land
The Framers' decision to use the word "all" to modify the word
"treaties" in the Supremacy Clause presents a difficult interpretive
problem. The phrase "Law of the Land" plainly refers to domestic law,
not international law. Thus, the statement that "all treaties" are the
"supreme Law of the Land" suggests that all treaty provisions have the
status of primary domestic law. However, it is clear that some treaty
provisions - even some provisions "made.. .under the authority of the
United States" - cannot be considered "domestic law" in any
meaningful sense of that term. For example, it makes no sense to say
that a treaty provision entitling the United States to raise certain claims
VIII, para. 1 S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-21 (1993), 32 I.L.M. 800 (establishing Organization for
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons); id. at art. VIII, para. 7 (providing that costs of
Organization's activities shall be paid by States Parties).
216 See supra note 134.
211 See HENKIN, supra note 8, at 204 ("When a treaty requires ... an appropriation of
funds to carry out United States obligations, only the Congress can supply them.");
CRANDALL, supra note 139, at 164 ("Treaties stipulating for the payment of money are
carried into effect only pursuant to legislation of Congress for this purpose."). But see
Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, supra note 4, at 780-81 (contending that the appropriations
power is not exclusive to Congress).
218 The question whether the treaty makers can create a domestic legal duty for
Congress to enact legislation has been debated for more than 200 years. See, e.g.,
CRANDALL, supra note 139, at 165-71. As Professor Henkin has stated, this debate "has not
been authoritatively resolved in principle." HENKIN, supra note 8, at 205.
219 If one assumes that the treaty makers do have the authority to create a domestic
legal duty for Congress to appropriate funds, then the duty to contribute funds would be
automatically converted into primary domestic law by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, and
the treaty provision requiring a contribution of funds would be "made ... under the
authority of the United States," even for purposes of domestic law. Proponents of this
view, though, would generally concede that the duty to appropriate funds is nonjusticiable.
See infra note 284.
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in the International Court of Justice is "domestic law," because the
provision operates exclusively in the international sphere, not the
domestic sphere. 20 More broadly, the dualist principle that international
law and domestic law are distinct legal systems suggests that certain
international legal rules cannot have the status of domestic law because,
by their nature, they operate exclusively within the international legal
system. Therefore, a strictly literal reading of the statement that "all
treaties" are "Law of the Land" makes no sense.
However, the conclusion that a strictly literal interpretation is
untenable does not mean that it is permissible simply to construe the
phrase "all treaties" to mean "some treaties."22' If the activity of
constitutional interpretation is to be a legal enterprise, rather than a
political enterprise, those engaged in constitutional interpretation cannot
ignore the text completely. 22 Accordingly, this Article contends that the
statement that "all treaties" are "Law of the Land" should be construed
to mean, at a minimum, that all treaty provisions that create primary
international legal duties binding on the United States have the status of
primary domestic law.
There are two main reasons why the phrase "all treaties" in the
Supremacy Clause should be construed to include, at a minimum, all
treaty provisions that create primary international legal duties binding
on the United States. First, the main objection to a literal interpretation
of the phrase "all treaties" is that some treaty provisions cannot be
' See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Dec. 9, 1948, art. IX, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951) (providing that
disputes "relating to the interpretation, application or fulfillment of the present
Convention... shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of any
of the parties to the dispute").
"2 Some scholars have effectively construed the phrase "all treaties" to mean "some
treaties." See, e.g., Yoo, Rejoinder, supra note 3, at 2220 (contending that treaties "in areas
that fall within Congress's Article I, Section 8 powers" are not law of the land).
' See generally Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on
Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221 (1995).
' This formulation excludes the following three types of treaty provisions: (1)
provisions that create remedies within the international legal system; (2) provisions that
create primary duties binding on entities other than the United States; and (3) provisions
that create primary powers and liberties, as opposed to primary duties. Treaty provisions
that create remedies within the international legal system generally cannot be converted
into domestic law because they operate exclusively within the international sphere.
Provisions that create duties binding on entities other than the United States generally
cannot be converted into domestic law because they are not binding on the United States.
As noted above, there are some cases where primary powers and liberties can be converted
into domestic law. See supra note 208. However, there are other cases where it makes no
sense to speak of converting an international power or liberty into domestic law because
the provision operates exclusively within the international sphere. See supra note 208.
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converted into domestic law because they operate exclusively within the
international legal system. That objection, though, does not apply to
primary treaty duties. There is no such thing as a primary treaty duty
that operates exclusively in the international sphere because, for any
duty that is internationally binding on the United States, there is
someone within the domestic legal system who has the capacity to act (or
fail to act) in a way that places the United States in violation of its
international duty. 24
Second, the Framers of the Constitution chose to include treaties in the
Supremacy Clause primarily to help avoid unwanted violations of the
United States' international treaty obligations.225  Duty-creating
provisions are the only type of treaty provisions that potentially give rise
to treaty violations; it is not possible to violate a power-creating or
226liberty-creating provision. Therefore, automatic conversion of power
and/or liberty creating provisions would not promote the objectives that
the Framers sought to achieve by including treaties in the Supremacy
Clause. In contrast, automatic conversion of duty-creating provisions
does promote those objectives by imposing a domestic legal constraint
on the authority of relevant actors within the domestic legal system to
act (or refrain from acting) in a manner that places the United States in
violation of its international duty.
' If Congress is the only institution with the domestic legal authority to implement the
actions necessary to fulfill the treaty duty, then one might say that conversion of the duty
into domestic law is barred because the treaty makers lack the constitutional authority to
create a domestic legal duty for Congress to enact legislation. See supra notes 217-218 and
accompanying text. However, that is a constitutional constraint on automatic conversion
(which is consistent with the qualified automatic conversion rule). It differs in kind from
the constraints that preclude conversion of international legal rules that operate exclusively
in the international sphere.
"' See, e.g., Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 276-77 (1796) (Iredell, J., concurring); see
also Vhzquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 10, at 697-700. A narrower reading of the historical
materials might suggest that the Framers chose to include treaties in the Supremacy Clause
solely to avoid treaty violations by the states. It is true that the federal government's
inability under the Articles of Confederation to remedy treaty violations by the states was a
major factor underlying the decision to include treaties in the Supremacy Clause.
However, this narrower reading overlooks the fact that the Framers sought to ensure U.S.
compliance with its international legal obligations "as a moral imperative - a matter of
national honor." Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A
Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 461, 482 (1989). See also Detlev F. Vagts, The United States
and Its Treaties: Observance and Breach, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 313, 324-25 (2001) (contending that
Founding Fathers viewed treaty compliance as a matter of national honor).
' Colloquially, people often speak of an "abuse of power." However, a genuine abuse
of power invariably entails a violation of some duty - typically, a duty derived from one's
position of power.
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Professors Bradley and Goldsmith contend that the Supremacy Clause
does not give treaties "the status of self-executing federal law," but
merely makes "federal laws supreme over state laws.", 7 This statement
is ambiguous. If they mean that all treaty provisions are supreme over
state law, then it follows that all treaty provisions have the status of
primary domestic law because treaties could not be superior to state law
if they did not have that status. On the other hand, if they mean that
only some treaty provisions are supreme over state laws, they fail to
justify their position that the phrase "all treaties" in the text of the
Supremacy Clause should be construed to exclude some treaties.2'
In sum, the statement that all treaties are the supreme Law of the Land
means that all treaty provisions that create primary international duties
binding on the United States have the status of primary domestic law,
subject to the constitutional limitations noted above.
3. Shall Be
The Supremacy Clause does not say that all treaties "are" the Law of
the Land. It says that all treaties "shall be" the Law of the Land. Hence,
one could argue, the Supremacy Clause does not automatically give
treaties the status of primary domestic law; it merely dictates that treaties
"shall be" made into law by a subsequent legislative act.29  This
argument appears to be textually plausible until one considers the fact
that the subject phrase - "shall be the supreme Law of the Land" -
applies not only to treaties, but also to statutes, and to the Constitution
itself. Thus, under this interpretation, every statute would require a
subsequent statute to give it status as supreme federal law, which in turn
would require a subsequent statute to give it status as supreme federal
law, ad infinitum. Because that interpretation is patently absurd, the
better view is that treaties "shall be" the Law of the Land automatically,
by the force of the Supremacy Clause itself.
A third interpretation is possible, though. Under this view, some
treaty provisions are automatically converted into primary domestic law,
whereas other treaty provisions require implementing legislation before
they acquire the status of primary domestic law. As noted above, there
Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 163, at 446; see also Yoo, Rejoinder, supra note 3, at
2220 ("[T]he Supremacy Clause simply makes clear the superiority of federal law to state
law.").
2' See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (stating that "all Treaties" are "the supreme Law of the
Land.").
-- See Yoo, Rejoinder, supra note 3, at 2249.
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are some treaty provisions for which implementing legislation is
constitutionally required.m But even where implementing legislation is
not constitutionally required, there is nothing that prevents Congress
from choosing to enact legislation.21  As long as Congress enacts the
requisite implementing legislation, there is no constitutional difficulty.
Some treaty provisions are automatically converted into primary
domestic duties by virtue of the Supremacy Clause; others are converted
into primary domestic law by the force of implementing legislation.
Either way, the treaty duty becomes a primary domestic duty, consistent
with the constitutional requirement that all treaties "shall be" the
supreme Law of the Land.
Suppose, though, that Congress chooses not to enact the requisite
implementing legislation. Where implementing legislation is
constitutionally required and Congress chooses not to enact it, the treaty
duty would be internationally binding but it would not have the status
of primary domestic law. Such an outcome is consistent with the text of
the Supremacy Clause because the requirement that all treaties "shall be"
the Law of the Land applies only to treaties "made... under the
Authority of the United States,"2 3 and a treaty provision for which
implementing legislation is constitutionally required is not "made...
under the Authority of the United States" for purposes of domestic
See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
" The Executive Branch often recommends implementing legislation for treaties when
it submits the treaty to the Senate for its advice and consent, even in cases where legislation
is not constitutionally required. For example, the Deputy Secretary of State's letter of
submittal accompanying the Rotterdam Convention recommends legislation to clarify the
EPA's authority to prohibit exports of designated chemicals. See Rotterdam Convention
Concerning Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, Sept. 10, 1998, S.
TREATY DOC. No. 106-21 (2000), 1998 WL 1788082, at *11. As a constitutional matter, there
is little doubt that the treaty itself would provide sufficient authority for the EPA to issue
the necessary regulations. Even so, nothing in the Constitution precludes Congress from
enacting legislation to grant that authority to the EPA.
2 The Restatement adopts the view that, in the case of legislative implementation, it is
the statute, not the treaty, that becomes primary domestic law. RESTATEMENT (THIRD),
supra note 5, § 111 cmt. h. If the statute and the treaty are substantially identical, then the
question whether the treaty has independent status as primary domestic law has no
practical significance. If the statute and the treaty are not substantially identical, then it is
important to distinguish between those portions of the treaty that have been implemented
by legislation, and those that have not been implemented by legislation. As above, if a
particular provision has been implemented by legislation, then the question whether that
provision has independent status as primary domestic law has no practical significance.
With respect to provisions that have not been implemented by legislation, see infra notes
235-241 and accompanying text.
2 3 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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Finally, consider the case where implementing legislation is not
constitutionally required and Congress does not enact implementing
legislation.235 If pre-existing legislation satisfies the treaty requirements,
then the situation is analytically indistinguishable from cases where
Congress does enact implementing legislation.2 6 However, if Congress
does not enact implementing legislation and there is no pre-existing
legislation that satisfies the treaty requirements, a question arises: do the
treaty makers have the power to preclude automatic conversion by
stipulating in the treaty itself, or in a unilateral reservation or
declaration, that the treaty shall not have the status of primary domestic
law in the absence of implementing legislation?2
37
The Restatement doctrine assumes that the treaty makers have such a
power. If the treaty makers do have such a power, it must derive either
from their Article II power to make treaties or from the Supremacy
Clause.238 Professor V~zquez contends that Article II gives the treaty
makers the power to preclude automatic conversion.239 I address that
argument below.24 Others would apparently locate such a power in the
Supremacy Clause itself.24 1  Their position effectively construes the
constitutional requirement that treaties shall be the Law of the Land to
mean that the treaty makers have the power to decide that some treaty
' See supra notes 210-219 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Race Report, supra note 160, at 14 (stating that "no new implementing
legislation is considered necessary to give effect to the Convention").
' The claim that pre-existing law satisfies the treaty requirements is often made to
justify a decision not to seek implementing legislation. See, e.g., id. at 14 (stating that "the
specific requirements of the Convention find ample counterparts in our federal law").
237 There is no doubt that the treaty makers can stipulate that the treaty will not enter
into force internationally until after enactment of implementing legislation. See infra notes
257-261 and accompanying text. Hence, the precise question at issue is whether the treaty
makers have the power to preclude automatic conversion even after the treaty has entered
into force internationally.
See supra notes 201-202 and accompanying text.
See V~zquez, Laughing, supra note 17, at 2174-75.
240 See infra notes 279-295 and accompanying text.
241 See Yoo, Rejoinder, supra note 3, at 2249-57 (contending that treaties generally do not
create domestic law, but that Supremacy Clause gives treaty makers power to decide that
some treaties shall be domestic law); see also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 163, at 446-49.
Bradley and Goldsmith contend that the Supremacy Clause does not limit the treaty
makers' power to control the domestic legal effects of treaties. Id. This argument assumes
that the treaty makers have such a power, without identifying the source of that power or
characterizing the scope of that power. Properly stated, the question is not whether the
Supremacy Clause limits the power of the treaty makers, but whether the Constitution
gives the treaty makers the power to alter the constitutional rule embodied in the
Supremacy Clause.
HeinOnline  -- 36 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 54 2002-2003
Non-Self-Executing Treaties
provisions shall not be the Law of the Land, even in cases where
implementing legislation is not constitutionally required. That position
is impossible to reconcile with the text of the Supremacy Clause. A
constitutional provision specifying that treaties shall be law cannot be the
textual basis for imputing to the treaty makers a power to decide that
some treaty provisions shall not be law.
In sum, it is textually plausible to construe the phrase "shall be" to
mean that some treaty duties shall become the supreme Law of the Land
by the force of implementing legislation and others shall become the
supreme Law of the Land automatically, by virtue of the Supremacy
Clause. Moreover, there is nothing in the text of the Supremacy Clause,
or elsewhere in the Constitution that precludes the political branches
from deciding to enact implementing legislation, even in cases where
such legislation is not constitutionally required. However, it is not
permissible to read into the Supremacy Clause an implied power for the
treaty makers to decide that certain treaty provisions "made... under
the authority of the United States" shall not be the supreme Law of the
Land, because that interpretation conflicts directly with the
constitutional mandate that "all Treaties made... under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land." Therefore, as a
textual matter, the only plausible defense of the Restatement doctrine is
the proposition that Article II gives the treaty makers the power to
decide that some treaty provisions "made ... under the authority of the
United States" shall not be the supreme Law of the Land. Section B
addresses that argument.
B. Article II and the Restatement Doctrine
Section B contends that Article II should not be construed to give the
treaty makers the power to preclude automatic conversion of primary
treaty duties into domestic legal duties, because that interpretation of
Article II undermines United States compliance with its treaty
obligations without advancing any legitimate policy objective. The
analysis is divided into four parts. The first part demonstrates that there
is a significant tension between the Restatement doctrine and certain
structural features of the Constitution. The second part shows that
Professor Yoo's original intent defense of the Restatement doctrine is
flawed. The third part rebuts Professor Vizquez' defense of the
Restatement doctrine, which is based on his interpretation of the
2002]
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242Supreme Court's decision in Foster v. Neilson. The final section
considers the implications of rejecting the Restatement doctrine.
1. Structural Considerations - The Treaty Power and the Supremacy
Clause
Assume that the United States has ratified a treaty in which article 5
creates primary international legal duties. Assume further that the treaty
has entered into force internationally, that article 5 is binding on the
United States as a matter of international law, that there is no
constitutional impediment that would preclude automatic conversion of
article 5 into a primary domestic legal duty, and that Congress has not
243
enacted implementing legislation for article 5. The Restatement
doctrine holds that article 5 does not have the status of primary domestic
law if the treaty makers manifested their "intention that [article 5] shall
[not] become effective as domestic law of the United States at the time it
becomes binding on the United States," 244 either by including a provision
to that effect in the treaty or by adopting a unilateral declaration or
reservation to that effect.
The Restatement doctrine presupposes that the treaty makers have the
power to preclude a particular treaty provision from becoming the Law
of the Land, even if there is no constitutional impediment to automatic
conversion. Section A established that the presumed power cannot be
rooted in the Supremacy Clause. 24  Thus, implicit in the Restatement
doctrine is the assumption that the Treaty Power gives the treaty makers
the power "to countermand for a given treaty the [constitutional] rule
that the Supremacy Clause would otherwise establish."
2
The Restatement doctrine also presupposes that the treaty makers
have the power to shape primary domestic law directly - that is, without
modifying the international legal obligations they create. This is clear if
one considers a hypothetical treaty in which article 12 specifies that
article 5 "shall [not] become effective as domestic law of the United
States at the time it becomes [internationally] binding on the United
States." 247 In this example, article 12 relates exclusively to domestic law;
24 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
243 The stipulation that Congress has not enacted implementing legislation means, also,
that there is no pre-existing legislation that satisfies the requirements of article 5. See supra
note 236 and accompanying text.
244 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 16, § 141.
245 See supra notes 203-241 and accompanying text.
24 Vdzquez, Laughing, supra note 17, at 2187.
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 16, § 141.
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it has no international legal effect whatsoever. Even so, the Restatement
doctrine assumes that article 12 is a valid treaty provision, not just
internationally, but also domestically. 24 Thus, the Restatement doctrine
presupposes that the treaty makers have the domestic constitutional
power to create treaty provisions that affect primary domestic law even
if they have no international legal effect.
There are reasons to doubt the existence of such a power. The treaty
power is, first and foremost, a power to make international law by
means of international agreements. 24' By itself, it does not give the treaty
makers any power to create primary domestic law directly.25' The
combination of the Treaty Power and the Supremacy Clause gives the
treaty makers the power to create primary domestic law indirectly -
that is, by and through the international law they create. However, the
proposition that the treaty makers have a power to create treaty
provisions that have no international legal effect, but that still affect
primary domestic law, arguably runs afoul of the longstanding principle
that the treaty power extends only to matters that are "properly the
subject of negotiation with a foreign country."2 5 '
If one construes the combination of the Treaty Power and the
Supremacy Clause to grant the treaty makers a power to create primary
domestic law directly, that power would be virtually indistinguishable
from Congress' legislative power. Hence, this interpretation is difficult
to reconcile with Article I, which vests "all legislative powers" in
Congress.252 Moreover, the placement of the Treaty Power in Article II,
rather than Article I, suggests that the Framers conceived of the Treaty
Power as an executive power, not a legislative power.253 The view that
24 This Article contends that article 12 is not valid domestically. One could also make a
plausible argument that. article 12 is not valid internationally, either, but I leave that
argument for another day.
29 See HENKIN, supra note 8, at 216 (stating that "international agreements are primarily
international acts and make domestic law only incidentally").
' This point becomes evident if one hypothesizes a constitutional text in which Article
III and Article VI omitted any reference to treaties. See U.S. CONsT. art. 1I, § 2, cl. 1
(extending judicial power to cases arising under treaties); U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2
(providing that treaties are supreme Law of the Land). In that case, treaties would have no
domestic legal force in the absence of implementing legislation, and the federal judiciary
would not have jurisdiction to adjudicate claims arising under treaties. These
considerations show that the Treaty Power, by itself, does not give the treaty makers any
power to create primary domestic law directly - that is, independently of the international
law they create.
" Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890).
252 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
" Accord Yoo, Globalism, supra note 3, at 1966.
20021
HeinOnline  -- 36 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 57 2002-2003
University of California, Davis
the treaty makers have a power to create primary domestic law
indirectly, but not directly, preserves the distinction between legislative
and executive powers and avoids any conflict with the vesting provision
in Article I.
Proponents of the Restatement doctrine might agree that the treaty
makers do not have an affirmative power to create primary domestic law
directly. However, they may argue, the treaty makers have a negative
power to prevent particular treaty provisions from creating primary
domestic law, and they can exercise this power directly - that is,
independently of the international legal obligations embodied in the
treaty. This position partially ameliorates the problems associated with
the Restatement doctrine. However, proponents of that doctrine must
still acknowledge that this alleged negative power presupposes an
affirmative power to countermand the Supremacy Clause by deciding
that some treaty provisions shall not be the Law of the Land. Hence,
they must explain why one should imply, on the basis of the Treaty
Power, an affirmative power to countermand the Supremacy Clause.
There is at least one constitutional provision that gives the political
branches the power to countermand a constitutional rule: the Fourteenth
Amendment gives Congress the power to countermand the Eleventh
Amendment.254 However, this is a rare exception to the ordinary
principle that the political branches cannot override constitutional rules
merely by manifesting their intent to do so. Therefore, inasmuch as
proponents of the Restatement doctrine read into Article II an implied
power for the treaty makers to override the constitutional rule embodied
in the Supremacy Clause, they bear the burden of establishing an
exception to the ordinary presumption that constitutional rules are
immune from political manipulation.
In light of the preceding discussion, proponents of the Restatement
doctrine might make the following argument. The Treaty Power, by
itself, is a power to create international law, not domestic law. Further,
the treaty makers' power to create primary domestic law (indirectly)
derives only from the combination of the Treaty Power and the
Supremacy Clause.255 In addition, the power to create primary domestic
law directly is a legislative power, which the Constitution vests in
Congress. 25 6 Therefore, structural considerations support the view that
the treaty makers should have the discretion to allow Congress to decide
See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516-20 (1997).
See supra notes 249-251 and accompanying text.
2'6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
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whether a particular treaty provision shall become primary domestic
law.
In fact, the treaty makers do have the discretion to allow Congress to
decide whether a particular treaty provision shall become primary
domestic law: the treaty makers can exercise that discretion by deferring
international entry into force of the treaty until after Congress enacts
implementing legislation. 57  If the treaty makers want to defer the
international entry into force of a treaty until after Congress enacts
domestic implementing legislation, they have a variety of options for
doing so. First, they can specify in the text of the treaty that the treaty
shall "not take effect [internationally] until a law ha[s] been passed by
Congress to carry it into operation."' Second, the Senate can insist, as a
condition of its consent to ratification, that the treaty's entry into force
provision be amended to make the international entry into force of the
treaty contingent upon enactment of domestic implementing
legislation259 Third, the Senate can consent to ratification, subject to the
condition that the President shall not ratify the treaty until after
implementing legislation has been enacted. Finally, the treaty makers
can adopt a unilateral reservation to suspend the international operation
of a particular treaty provision until implementing legislation is enacted,
thereby allowing the majority of the treaty's provisions to take effect
261
sooner.
All of the preceding examples can be explained without reliance on a
presumed power to shape primary domestic law directly. In fact, all
four examples involve an exercise of the treaty makers' power to control
' The treaty makers also have other options for involving Congress without relying
upon a presumed power to countermand the Supremacy Clause. See infra notes 304-307
and accompanying text.
Bartram v. Robertson, 122 U.S. 116, 119 (1887) (paraphrasing terms of fifth article of
bilateral commercial convention between United States and Kingdom of Hawaii).
' See United States v. Am. Sugar Ref. Co., 202 U.S. 563, 565 (1906).
2' See, e.g., 132 CONG. REC. S1378 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1986) (Senate resolution of
ratification for Genocide Convention). Although this type of condition does not modify the
treaty's entry into force provision, it is a valid condition because the Senate's power to
provide "Advice and Consent" includes the power to establish a condition precedent for
treaty ratification. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
"' See Letter of Submittal accompanying the Protocols to the Convention on the Rights
of the Child, S. TREATY Doc. No. 106-37 (2000) (recommending "declaration" to suspend
particular international obligation of United States under Sale of Children Protocol).
Although the letter of submittal labels this condition a "declaration," it is in fact a
reservation because it modifies the United States' international legal obligations under the
Protocol by exempting the United States from a particular obligation until "the United
States informs the Secretary-General of the United Nations that its domestic law is in full
conformity with the requirements of Article 4(1) of the Protocol." Id.
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primary domestic law indirectly, because in each case the treaty makers
are postponing the domestic entry into force of the treaty (or a particular
provision) by postponing the international entry into force of the treaty
(or a particular provision). Moreover, these examples do not show that
the treaty makers have a power to countermand the Supremacy Clause.
The Supremacy Clause does not require the conversion of international
law into domestic law before the international law takes effect; it merely
requires conversion when the international law takes effect. All four
examples are consistent with this requirement. Because the treaty
makers' recognized power to require legislation as a precondition for
international entry into force of a treaty (or portion thereof) presupposes
neither a power to shape primary domestic law directly, nor a power to
countermand the Supremacy Clause, the existence of such a recognized
power does not support the Restatement doctrine.
When the treaty makers defer international entry into force of a treaty
until after Congress enacts implementing legislation, they involve
Congress in shaping the domestic legal effects of treaty ratification, while
simultaneously ensuring that the United States is able to comply with its
international treaty obligations immediately upon entry into force of the
treaty.262 In contrast, the Restatement doctrine presumes that the Treaty
Power gives the treaty makers the power to prevent domestic entry into
force of the treaty even after it enters into force internationally. In light
of the treaty makers' recognized power to defer international entry into
force of a treaty, a constitutional interpretation that grants the treaty
makers the additional power to prevent domestic entry into force even
after a treaty enters into force internationally serves only one purpose: it
gives the treaty makers the power to enter into binding obligations
internationally while simultaneously taking steps to undermine U.S.
compliance with those obligations. 263 The Framers certainly did not wish
264to encourage such a cynical approach to international law. Moreover,
- See, e.g., SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON CONVENTION ON
PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AND COOPERATION IN RESPECT OF INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION, S.
EXEC. REP. No. 106-14 (2000), at 12 (recommending that Senate provide its consent to
ratification subject to declaration that "[t]he President shall not deposit the instrument of
ratification for the Convention until such time as the federal law implementing the
Convention is enacted and the United States is able to carry out all the obligations of the
Convention...").
If a treaty duty is binding internationally, but not domestically, then individuals can
violate the treaty without any domestic legal consequence, thereby undermining treaty
compliance.
' See Burley, supra note 225, at 482 (contending that Framers sought to ensure U.S.
compliance with its international legal obligations "as a moral imperative - a matter of
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it would be contrary to U.S. national interests to adopt this approach to
treaty ratification because this approach would create the perception that
the United States does not take its treaty obligations seriously, thereby
making other countries more reluctant to enter into treaties with us and
undermining our efforts to persuade other countries to comply with
their treaty obligations.
2. Professor Yoo and the Framers' Intentions
Other scholars have analyzed in great detail the historical record
associated with the Constitutional Convention and the state ratification
debates. Whereas the majority view contends that the Framers'
intentions support an interpretation of the Supremacy Clause along the
lines of the qualified automatic conversion rule,2 5 Professor Yoo's
267historical narrative challenges that claim. I do not propose to engage
in that debate here. The aim of this section is far more modest - to
show that, even if one accepts Professor Yoo's historical narrative, that
narrative does not conflict with the qualified automatic conversion rule,
nor does it support the Restatement doctrine. In fact, Yoo's historical
narrative weighs against the Restatement doctrine because his narrative
supports a narrow construction of the scope of the Treaty Power. In
contrast, the Restatement doctrine presupposes an expansive view of the
scope of the Treaty Power because it tacitly assumes that Article 11 gives
the treaty makers the power to countermand the Supremacy Clause.
At the risk of oversimplifying Professor Yoo's richly detailed historical
narrative, his argument essentially supports two points. First, the
Framers intended for the House of Representatives to play a significant
role in treaty implementation.2 6 8 Second, the Framers conceived of the
treaty power as an executive power, not a legislative power. 269 Based on
these two premises, Yoo advocates strict separation of powers limitations
on the treaty makers' power to create primary domestic law.
Specifically, he advocates both a "hard" and a "soft" rule in favor of non-
national honor").
' See Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding,
and Treaties as "Supreme Law of the Land," 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2095, 2120-51 (1999); Paust, Self-
Executing Treaties, supra note 4, at 760-64; Vzquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 10, at 697-700;
Yoo, Globalism, supra note 3, at 2024-68.
See Flaherty, supra note 265; Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, supra note 4, at 760-64;
Vizquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 10, at 697-700.
17 See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 3, at 1960-63.
See id. at 2037-40.
See id. at 2069-74.
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self-execution.
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Yoo's hard rule contends that the treaty makers lack the constitutional
authority to create primary domestic law "in areas that fall within
Congress's Article I, Section 8 powers." 271 This hard rule is a variant of
the Whitney doctrine: treaty provisions within the scope of Article I,
Section 8, cannot be automatically converted into domestic law by the
force of the Supremacy Clause because they are not "made... under the
Authority of the United States" for purposes of domestic law. 272 Yoo's
hard rule is consistent with the qualified automatic conversion rule
because the latter rule incorporates separation of powers limitations on
automatic conversion.273 Yoo's hard rule is also internally consistent with
his historical narrative because the main thrust of his argument is that
the Framers intended for there to be strict separation of powers
limitations on the treaty makers' power to create primary domestic
law.274 But Yoo's hard rule does not support the Restatement doctrine
because it presupposes neither a power to countermand the Supremacy
27 276Clause27s nor a power to shape primary domestic law directly.
Yoo's "soft" rule is that, when construing treaty provisions within the
scope of Article I, Section 8, courts should presume that the treaty
makers did not intend to create primary domestic law unless the treaty
makers clearly manifest a contrary intention. 277  Because the treaty
27 Yoo, Rejoinder, supra note 3, at 2220.
27 Id. Professor Yoo vacillates between a "primary law" concept of self-execution and a
"remedial law" concept of self-execution. Compare Yoo, Globalism, supra note 3, at 1969-70
(analyzing cases in terms that suggest remedial law concept of self-execution) with id. at
2092 (suggesting that non-self-executing treaties lack status of primary domestic law).
Although at times he expresses his "hard" rule in terms that imply a remedial law concept
of non-self-execution, his argumentation supporting the hard rule fits best with the indirect
primary version of the intent thesis because he is concerned with constitutional limits on
the scope of the treaty makers' power to create primary domestic law.
2 See supra notes 132-134 and accompanying text.
' See supra notes 210-219 and accompanying text.
27 This statement is not intended to be an endorsement either of Yoo's hard rule, or of
his structural and historical arguments. It is merely an observation that Yoo's hard rule is
internally consistent with those arguments.
'= Yoo's hard rule does not presuppose a power to countermand the Supremacy
Clause because it is a variant of the indirect primary version of the intent thesis, and the
indirect primary version is entirely consistent with the Supremacy Clause. See supra notes
132-134 and accompanying text.
276 Yoo's hard rule presupposes that the treaty makers have a power to shape primary
domestic law indirectly. That is, they indirectly preclude automatic conversion, not because
they intend to preclude automatic conversion, but because they choose (intentionally) to
create the type of treaty provision for which automatic conversion is constitutionally
barred.
27 Yoo, Rejoinder, supra note 3, at 2220.
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makers' intent is relevant only insofar as they have the power to achieve
a given result, Yoo's soft rule makes sense only if: (a) there are no
constitutional impediments to using the treaty power to create primary
domestic law within the scope of Article I, Section 8;278 and (b) the treaty
makers have the power to decide that some treaty provisions shall not be
the Law of the Land, even if automatic conversion is not constitutionally
barred. Thus, Yoo's soft rule is consistent with the Restatement doctrine
because it presupposes that the treaty makers have the power to
countermand the Supremacy Clause by deciding that certain treaty
provisions shall not be the Law of the Land, even if there is no
constitutional impediment to automatic conversion. However, Yoo's soft
rule is inconsistent with his historical argument because his soft rule
assumes that there are few, if any, separation of powers limitations on
the scope of the treaty power, whereas his historical narrative is
designed to show that there are substantial separation of powers
limitations on the scope of the treaty power.
In sum, Yoo's hard rule is consistent with his historical narrative but it
does not support the Restatement doctrine. In contrast, Yoo's soft rule is
consistent with the Restatement doctrine but it is at odds with his
historical narrative. Therefore, Yoo's historical narrative provides no
support for the direct primary version of the intent thesis. Since the
historical narratives of other scholars generally support interpretation of
the Supremacy Clause in accordance with the qualified automatic
conversion rule, none of the leading historical accounts support the
Restatement doctrine.
3. Professor Vizquez' Defense of the Restatement Doctrine
Professor V~zquez has defended the thesis that Article II gives the
treaty makers a power to countermand the Supremacy Clause.2 7
Although Vdzquez concedes that there is a significant tension between
the Restatement doctrine and the text of the Supremacy Clause, he
278 Yoo tacitly admits this point. He contends that if "the treatymakers can exercise a
single Article I, Section 8 power granted to Congress, then the treatymakers must be able to
exercise all of Congress' legislative powers." Id. at 2236. Given this assumption, Yoo is left
with two options. One option (Yoo's hard rule) is that all of Congress' Article I, Section 8
powers are exclusive powers. The second option (Yoo's soft rule) is that all of Congress'
Article I, Section 8 powers are concurrent powers, but courts should presume that the
treaty makers did not intend to create primary domestic law within the scope of Article I,
Section 8.
" V~zquez, Laughing, supra note 17, at 2184-88.
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contends that the Supreme Court's decision in Foster v. Neilson28
supports the Restatement doctrine. His argument merits detailed
consideration because it is the most sophisticated effort by any scholar to
defend the direct primary version of the intent thesis.
Vdzquez begins by distinguishing between a treaty provision that says
"do not deport refugees," which he calls a Type A provision, and a treaty
provision that says "pass legislation prohibiting the deportation of
refugees," which he calls a Type B provision.281 He is clearly right tolr . 282
assert that Type B provisions are not self-executing, but it is important
to explain why that is so. Professor Vdzquez' Type B provision creates
an international legal duty to enact legislation; it does not create an
international legal duty to refrain from deporting refugees. The
international duty to enact legislation might be said to be non-self-
executing for one of two reasons. If one believes that the treaty makers
lack the constitutional power to create a domestic legal duty for
Congress to enact legislation, then the Type B provision would not be
automatically converted into domestic law because the Constitution
precludes automatic conversion. As noted above, this is an example of
the Whitney doctrine that is entirely consistent with the Supremacy
Clause and the qualified automatic conversion rule.m On the other
hand, if one believes that the treaty makers do have the power to create a
domestic legal duty for Congress to enact legislation, then the
international duty to enact legislation would be automatically converted
into domestic law. However, it would not be judicially enforceable
because it is clearly nonjusticiable. 284 This is an example of the Foster
doctrine, which is also consistent with the Supremacy Clause and the
qualified automatic conversion rule.
If I understand Professor Vdzquez correctly, he would agree that a
Type B provision, standing alone, is not evidence of the treaty makers'
27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
's Vizquez, Laughing, supra note 17, at 2184.
2M2 Id.
' See supra notes 210-219 and accompanying text.
Different courts might articulate different rationales as to why a lawsuit seeking to
compel Congress to comply with an international legal duty to enact legislation is
nonjusticiable. For example, a court might say that Congress, as an institution, is entitled to
sovereign immunity, and Members of Congress enjoy absolute immunity for acts and
omissions that are integral to their legislative function. See Eastland v. United States
Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 502-4 (1975). One might also say, though, that a duty to
legislate is horizontal. See supra notes 115-123 and accompanying text. In Professor
V~zquez' example, the Type A duty not to deport refugees is owed to the refugees
(vertical), but the Type B duty to enact legislation is owed only to other countries.
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power to countermand the Supremacy Clause. But he then hypothesizes
a treaty in which article 1 creates a Type A duty and article 27 states:
"The requirements of articles 1-26 shall be achieved through future acts
of domestic lawmaking."2 There are three possible ways to interpret
this pairing of articles 1 and 27. First, one could construe article 1 to be
mandatory and executed, both domestically and internationally, while
construing article 27 to be precatory, imposing a duty to legislate only on
those countries where treaties are never self-executing. Under this
interpretation, article 1 is self-executing in the sense that it is judicially
enforceable in domestic courts without the need for implementinglegislation.287
A second possible interpretation is that article 27 renders article 1
executory in both the domestic and international spheres. In other
words, the pairing of articles 1 and 27 creates a duty not to deport
refugees, subject to a condition precedent that the duty does not become
effective, either domestically or internationally, until future
implementing legislation is enacted. Under this interpretation, the
domestic duty is precisely coterminous with the international duty: both
the domestic and international duty are executory until legislation is
enacted, at which point the duty becomes executed on both the domestic
and international planes. This interpretation is entirely consistent with
the Supremacy Clause because the Supremacy Clause converts into
domestic law only that which exists as a matter of international law: the
Clause can never convert an executory international duty into an
executed domestic duty. Thus, under this interpretation, article 27 is
valid, but its validity does not depend upon any presumed power to
countermand the Supremacy Clause.
Vizquez, Laughing, supra note 17, at 2187.
This interpretive approach is consistent with the State Department's proposed
approach to ratification of the International Plant Protection Convention, Nov. 17, 1997, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 106-23 (2000), available in 1997 WL 33143607. Article 1 of the Convention
is an example of what Professor Vizquez calls a Type B provision. It states, in part, that
"the contracting parties undertake to adopt the legislative, technical and administrative
measures specified in this Convention." Id., art. I. Notwithstanding this apparent
international duty to legislate, the Secretary of State's letter of submittal states that "no new
legislation is necessary" because existing legislation "provides sufficient authority to
implement U.S. obligations under the revised IPPC." Id. at *7. In effect, Secretary
Albright's position was that the substantive obligations of the Convention are self-
executing, despite the fact that article I could be construed to render them non-self-
executing.
This assumes, as Professor V~zquez notes, that Article 1 is sufficiently determinate
for the provision to be judicially enforceable. See Vizquez, Laughing, supra note 17, at 2184.
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A third possible interpretation, which Professor Vizquez appears to
endorse,m is that article 1 is immediately effective as a matter of
international law but, due to article 27, does not become effective as a
matter of domestic law until after implementing legislation is enacted.
Assume that this interpretation is correct and that article 27 is valid, both
domestically and internationally.289 Given these assumptions, article 27
would countermand the Supremacy Clause by precluding automatic
conversion of article 1. Additionally, under these assumptions, article 27
would affect primary domestic law directly, without affecting
international law, because under this interpretation article 27 has no
international legal effect whatsoever. 290
Professor Vizquez asserts that the Supreme Court's decision in Foster
v. Neilson2 1 1 establishes the validity of article 27 under this third
interpretation.9 2 Assuming, arguendo, that his interpretation of Foster is
correct, 293 it does not establish the validity of article 27 under the third
interpretation. Vdzquez claims that "Foster recognizes that a treaty is not
self-executing if the obligation it imposes is an obligation to enact
domestic legislation." 294 This describes a treaty with a Type B provision,
but no Type A provision. As noted above, one can explain the non-self-
executing character of this type of treaty without relying on any special
power to countermand the Supremacy Clause. A mere duty to legislate
is not self-executing either because the treaty makers lack the power to
create a domestic legal duty to legislate (Whitney), or because such a
domestic legal duty is nonjusticiable (Foster).9
But Vdzquez posits a very different type of treaty - one with a Type
A provision that is effective internationally, but not domestically, and a
Type B provision that is effective domestically, but not internationally.
He cannot rely on Foster to establish the treaty makers' power to create
this type of treaty because Foster, under his interpretation, simply
involved a Type B provision that applied in the same way both
domestically and internationally. Thus, in the final analysis, Professor
See id. at 2187-88.
With respect to the international validity of article 27, see infra note 347.
The fact that article 27 is part of the treaty does not give it international legal effect.
Under this interpretation, article 27 modifies the domestic legal effect of article 1 without
affecting the international legal obligation created by article 1.
27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
292 Vizquez, Laughing, supra note 17, at 2187.
23 As noted above, I disagree with Professor Vzquez' interpretation of Foster. See
supra notes 73-101 and accompanying text.
Vdzquez, Laughing, supra note 17, at 2181.
" See supra notes 281-284 and accompanying text.
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V~zquez' argument merely assumes the validity of his conclusion. He
assumes that the treaty makers have the power to countermand the
Supremacy Clause; and he assumes that they have the power to shape
primary domestic law directly, without affecting the international
obligations they create. The first assumption is at odds with the text of
the Supremacy Clause and with the basic principle that the political
branches cannot alter constitutional rules by a mere act of political will.
The second assumption is at odds with the nature of the Treaty Power.
Article II, in tandem with the Supremacy Clause, gives the treaty makers
a power to control primary domestic law by and through the
international legal provisions they create, but it was never intended to
give the treaty makers a power to control primary domestic law without
affecting international law in any way.
4. Implications of Rejecting the Restatement Doctrine
It is important to specify precisely the type of treaty provision that
would be invalidated if courts rejected the Restatement doctrine. Recall
the aforementioned distinction between a Type A treaty' provision (one
that says "do not deport refugees") and a Type B treaty provision (one
that says "pass legislation prohibiting the deportation of refugees").
Rejection of the Restatement doctrine would not invalidate Type B
provisions, as such. However, a problem arises if a Type A and Type B
provision are paired together in a single treaty so that the Type A
provision is immediately effective as a matter of international law, but
the Type B provision deprives the Type A provision of domestic legal
force unless or until implementing legislation is enacted. I will refer to a
Type B provision that has this effect as a "spoiler provision." If the
Restatement doctrine is rejected, spoiler provisions would be the only
type of treaty provisions that would be invalidated.9 6
Although it is difficult to prove a negative, it seems likely that rejection
of the Restatement doctrine would not invalidate any actual treaty
provision, because there is no evidence that the United States has ever
entered into a treaty with a spoiler provision. Between 1789 and 1989,
the United States concluded 1,501 treaties. It is beyond the scope of
this article to examine every treaty concluded by the United States.
However, a search of all 182 treaties that the President submitted to the
See supra notes 279-295 and accompanying text.
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., 103D CONG., 1ST SESS., TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 14 (Comm. Print
1993).
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Senate in the 103rd through 106th Congresses demonstrates that none of
those treaties contains a spoiler provision.29
This result should not be surprising. As an initial matter, it is unclear
why another country would agree to include a spoiler provision in a
treaty. In countries with dualist systems, such as the United Kingdom,
where treaties generally are not ratified (and hence do not take effect
either internationally or domestically) until after implementing
legislation is enacted,2 W the Type A provision would become effective
both domestically and internationally at the time of ratification, so the
spoiler provision would have no effect. Similarly, in countries with
monist systems, such as the Netherlands, where a treaty that has entered
into force internationally "automatically becomes part of Dutch law after
it has been published," 3w the spoiler provision would also have no effect,
because the Netherlands Constitution dictates that the Type A provision
has domestic legal effect independent of any implementing legislation.301
In short, assuming that the spoiler provision could effectively control the
domestic legal status of a Type A provision in the United States, there
are many countries for which it would have no domestic legal effect
whatsoever. Moreover, the spoiler provision is tantamount to a
declaration by the United States that "we will sign the treaty, and we will
ratify the treaty, but we can't promise to comply with the treaty - that's
for Congress to decide."302 What could possibly persuade our treaty
partners to agree to include such a provision in a treaty?
Proponents of the Restatement doctrine claim that the treaty makers'
ability to postpone the domestic legal effect of a treaty, pending
implementing legislation, is essential to preserve the House role in
shaping the domestic consequences of treaty ratification.3 3  In fact,
' This conclusion is based on an electronic search in the Westlaw "USTREATIES"
database.
See The Right Honourable the Lord Templeman, Treaty-Making and the British
Parliament, 67 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 459, 464 (1991) ("Thus treaties which affect the rights of
the Crown subjects are made subject to the approval of Parliament, and are normally either
submitted for its approval before ratification or ratified under condition.").
Pieter van Dijk & Bahiyyih G. Tahzib, Parliamentary Participation in the Treaty-Making
Process of the Netherlands, 67 Chi.-KENT L. REV. 413,418 (1991).
See id. at 417-19.
32 The only purpose served by a spoiler provision that cannot be accomplished by
some other type of treaty provision is that a spoiler provision allows the treaty makers to
enter into binding obligations internationally while simultaneously taking steps to
undermine U.S. compliance with those obligations. See supra notes 257-264 and
accompanying text; see also infra notes 304-308 and accompanying text.
"' See, e.g., Yoo, Globalism, supra note 3, at 2093-94 (arguing that President and Senate
should render multilateral treaties non-self-executing to preserve House's control over
[Vol. 36:1
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though, the treaty makers do not need to use spoiler provisions because
they utilize a variety of other types of treaty provisions to accomplish
that objective.
For example, treaty drafters sometimes include "anti-preemption"
provisions in treaties, which essentially incorporate provisions of
domestic law as a limitation on the scope of the international duty
embodied in the treaty.i In other cases, treaty drafters include "non-
derogation" provisions, which specify that a treaty merely establishes a
minimum level of protection, but does not prevent the parties from
providing greater protection under their domestic laws. These are
both methods of framing international treaty provisions in a way that
preserves the flexibility of domestic lawmakers to regulate matters
related to the treaty without modifying or breaching the United States'
international obligations.
As discussed above, treaty drafters can include in a treaty a provision
that postpones international entry into force until after domestic
implementing legislation is adopted. In multilateral treaties, the treaty
drafters often include fairly general provisions in the treaty, leaving
domestic legislative and regulatory authorities to work out the details.
3
These options enable treaty drafters to conclude an agreement that is
binding both domestically and internationally, but that still leaves ample
flexibility for domestic legislative and regulatory authorities to shape the
domestic legal effects of treaty ratification.
domestic legislation).
See, e.g., Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on
Income, Oct. 2, 1996, art, 26, U.S.-Switz., S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-8 (1997) (requiring
Contracting States to exchange specified information, but in paragraph 3 expressly limiting
that duty as follows: "In no case shall the provisions of the Article be construed so as to
impose upon either of the Contracting States the obligation to... supply particulars which
are not procurable under its own legislation.").
See, e.g., Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of
Investment, Sept. 23, 1992, U.S.-Arm., art. IX, S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-11 (1993) ("This
treaty shall not derogate from: (a) laws and regulations, administrative practices or
procedures, or administrative or adjudicatory decisions of either Party... that entitle
investments or associated activities to treatment more favorable than that accorded by this
Treaty in like situations.").
0 See supra notes 257-261 and accompanying text.
' See, e.g., International Convention for Suppression of Financing Terrorism, Dec. 9,
1999, art. 18, para. 1, S. TREATY Doc. No. 106-49 (2000) ("States Parties shall cooperate in
the prevention of the offences set forth in article 2 by taking all practicable measures, inter
alia, by. adapting their domestic legislation, if necessary, to prevent and counter
preparations in their respective territories for the commission of those offences within or
outside their territories, including ...").
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Granted, inclusion of a spoiler provision is one theoretical option for
preserving a role for the House in shaping the domestic legal effects of
treaties. However, spoiler provisions are constitutionally problematic
because they are valid domestically only if the treaty makers have a
constitutional power to countermand the Supremacy Clause. Because
the existence of such a power is at best uncertain, and because treaty
drafters have other, constitutionally sound options for ensuring a House
role in treaty implementation, it should come as no surprise that treaty
drafters do not include spoiler provisions in U.S. treaties.
Moreover, the mechanisms that the treaty makers actually do utilize to
help preserve a House role in domestic implementation of treaties all
have one vital feature in common: they all maintain a symmetry
between domestic and international law so that the scope of domestic
legal duties under a treaty is precisely coterminous with the scope of the
international duties. In contrast, spoiler provisions drive a wedge
between domestic and international law by purporting to create
international legal duties without any corresponding domestic legal
duties. Creation of international duties without corresponding domestic
duties undermines treaty compliance because it permits individuals to
violate treaties without any domestic legal sanction. Therefore, the
only objective that can be accomplished by spoiler provisions that cannot
be accomplished by some other mechanism is to encourage treaty
violations. Moreover, since spoiler provisions are the only type of treaty
provision whose validity depends upon the Restatement doctrine, the
only purpose that doctrine serves is to give the treaty makers the power
to enter into binding obligations internationally while simultaneously
taking steps to encourage treaty violations by actors within the domestic
legal system. The Framers of our Constitution would be horrified to
learn that a doctrine promoting that objective gained widespread
acceptance among U.S. courts and commentators during the latter half of
the twentieth century.
C. Doctrinal Support for the Restatement Doctrine
One possible objection to the preceding critique of the Restatement
doctrine is that the doctrine is so deeply entrenched in judicial precedent
that it must be retained. This section demonstrates that doctrinal
support for the Restatement doctrine is "a mile wide and an inch deep."
Of course, creation of a domestic duty does not necessarily ensure that there will be
domestic legal sanctions for violations of that duty. See supra notes 38-40 and
accompanying text. However, absent a domestic duty there can be no domestic sanctions.
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The Supreme Court has never endorsed the Restatement doctrine. Prior
to publication of the Restatement (Second) in 1965, there was virtually no
support for the doctrine. Finally, although courts and commentators
today generally accept the doctrine, they rarely even acknowledge, much
less attempt to defend, the key constitutional assumption underlying the
doctrine - the assumption that the treaty makers have the constitutional
power to countermand the Supremacy Clause.
1. Supreme Court Precedent
Since Whitney v. Robertson, the Supreme Court has published only
nine decisions expressing a definite view that a particular treaty
provision was or was not self-executing.31 None of those decisions
supports the Restatement doctrine. In Trans World Airlines, Asakura, and
Fok Young Yo, the Court failed to identify any criteria whatsoever for
distinguishing between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties.311
Clearly, conclusory statements that a treaty is or is not self-executing say
nothing about the treaty makers' power to countermand the Supremacy
Clause.
In Maul, Cook, and Aguilar, the Court relied primarily on the Secretary
of State's legal opinion to determine whether a particular treaty
312provision was self-executing. In Cameron Septic, the Court held, as an
124 U.S. 190 (1888).
3,0 INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984); Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466
U.S. 243 (1984); Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523 (1951); Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co.,
318 U.S. 724 (1943) (Stone, C.J., concurring/dissenting); Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102
(1933); Maul v. United States, 274 U.S. 501 (1927); Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332
(1924); Cameron Septic Tank Co. v. City of Knoxville, 227 U.S. 39 (1913); Fok Young Yo v.
United States, 185 U.S. 296 (1902).
There are six other cases since Whitney in which the Court used the adjective "self-
executing" to modify the word "treaty": Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155,
167 (1993); United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 667 (1992); Factor v.
Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 300 (1933); United States v. Lee Yen Tai; 185 U.S. 213, 221
(1902); DeLima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 195 (1901); and Mitchell v. Furman, 180 U.S. 402, 428
(1901). These six cases do not express a definite opinion as to whether a particular treaty
provision is or is not self-executing, much less suggest any criteria for determining whether
a particular provision is self-executing.
311 See Trans World Airlines, 466 U.S. at 252 (stating that Warsaw Convention is self-
executing treaty); Asakura, 265 U.S. at 341 (bilateral treaty with Japan "operates of itself
without the aid of any legislation"); Fok Young Yo, 185 U.S. at 303 (stating that 1880 treaty,
which was not at issue in that case, was not self-executing, but "the provision of this treaty
applicable here" (an 1894 treaty) "proceeded on the ground of its existence.., and no act of
Congress was required").
312 See Cook, 288 U.S. at 119 n.19 (citing Secretary of State in support of proposition that
subject treaty was self-executing); Maul, 274 U.S. at 530, n.34 (Brandeis, J., concurring)
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alternative holding, that the patent treaty on which plaintiff based its
claim was not self-executing." The Court relied in part on a formal legal
opinion of the Attorney General, which reasoned that an earlier patent
treaty was executory because "each party to it covenants to grant in the
future to the subjects and citizens of the other parties certain special
rights in consideration of the granting of like special rights to its subjects
or citizens."314 The Court in Cameron Septic neither stated nor implied
that the treaty makers have a power to shape primary domestic law
without affecting international law. Moreover, it bears emphasis that the
Court in these four cases was relying on legal opinions expressed by the
political branches to distinguish between self-executing and non-self-
executing treaty provisions. None of the four cases suggests that the
intent of the political branches is a relevant criterion for distinguishing
between self-executing and non-self-executing treaty provisions.
In Warren, the Court explicitly rejected the Secretary of State's legal
opinion on self-execution. Viewed together with the four cases cited in
the previous paragraph, Warren suggests that the Court will sometimes,
but not always, defer to the Executive Branch's legal opinion on self-
execution. However, these cases offer no support for the proposition
that the treaty makers have the power to countermand the Supremacy
Clause.
Finally, in Stevic the Court stated that "the language of article 34 [of
the Protocol on the Status of Refugees] was precatory and not self-
executing., 316 Assuming that the Court meant that article 34 is not self-
executing because it is precatory, the statement merely stands for the
unremarkable proposition that a treaty provision that does not create
(quoting statement by Secretary of State: "The proposed treaty is, in a strict sense, self-
executing, requiring no legislation on the part of Congress to make it effective"). In
Aguilar, Chief Justice Stone, in a partial dissent, cited a letter written by the Secretary of
State to support his view that Article 2 of the Shipowners' Liability Convention was
partially self-executing and partially non-self-executing. Aguilar, 318 U.S. at 738 (Stone,
C.J., concurring/dissenting).
313 Cameron Septic Tank Co. v. City of Knoxville, 227 U.S. 39, 47-50 (1913).
314 See 19 Op. Att'y Gen. 273, 278 (1889) (emphasis added).
315 Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523, 526-28 (1951) (holding that Article 2 of
Shipowners' Liability Convention was entirely self-executing, despite the Secretary of
State's contrary view). Warren must be viewed as sui generis because it involved the
question whether a treaty-based primary liberty was automatically converted into domestic
law. See supra note 208.
36 INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 428-29, n.22 (1984). The Court's conclusion that the
language of article 34 is precatory is eminently reasonable. Article 34 states: "The
Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of
refugees."
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international legal duties cannot create domestic legal duties. If, on the
other hand, the Court understood the term "not self-executing" to mean
something other than "precatory," then the term "not self-executing" is
undefined and the conclusion that article 34 is non-self-executing is
unsupported by any rationale. Either way, the Court's statement does
not support the Restatement doctrine.
317In sum, since its decision in Whitney v. Robertson, the Court has never
articulated coherent criteria for distinguishing between self-executing
and non-self-executing treaty provisions. Moreover, the Court has never
stated or implied that the treaty makers have the power to countermand
the Supremacy Clause. Thus, there is no Supreme Court authority for
the Restatement doctrine.318
2. Precursors of the Restatement Doctrine
Before publication of the Restatement (Second) in 1965, there was
virtually no doctrinal support for the Restatement doctrine. The first two
State Department Digests of International Law,1 9 published in 1887 and
1906, respectively, provide support for the Whitney doctrine 32 and theFoster doctrine,32' but not the Restatement doctrine.3z  Hackworth's
317 124 U.S. 190 (1888).
318 The two cases most frequently cited in support of the Restatement doctrine are Foster
v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829), and Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888). For
analysis of Foster, see supra notes 75-101 and accompanying text. For analysis of Whitney,
see supra notes 135-155 and accompanying text.
319 See FRANCIS WHARTON, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
(1887) [hereinafter Wharton DIGEST]; JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1906) [hereinafter Moore DIGEST]. Both digests are multi-volume treatises, published
by the Government Printing Office, that contain excerpts from Executive Branch
documents and judicial opinions pertaining to international law.
" See, e.g., Treaties, 5 Moore DIGEST, supra note 319, § 758, at 222 ("A treaty is the
supreme law of the land in respect of such matters only as the treaty-making power,
without the aid of Congress, can carry into effect. Where a treaty stipulates for the
payment of money for which an appropriation is required, it is not operative in the sense of
the Constitution.").
321 See Treaties, 2 Wharton DIGEST, supra note 319, § 138, at 73 ("A treaty, when
proclaimed, is thenceforth the law of the land, to be respected as such, although, as in the
case of many laws of a merely municipal character, some of the provisions thereof may be
contingent or executory only.").
32 Moore and Wharton do provide support for two propositions that are sometimes
mistakenly assumed to constitute authority for the Restatement doctrine. First, a treaty
requires implementing legislation if the treaty itself specifies that it shall not enter into
force internationally until implementing legislation is enacted. Second, a treaty requires
implementing legislation if it imposes on the United States an international legal duty to
enact legislation. See Treaties, 2 Wharton DIGEST, supra note 319, §§ 132, 138; Treaties, 5
Moore DIGEST, supra note 319, § 758. For an explanation of why these two propositions do
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Digest,323 published in 1943, also supports the Whitney and Foster
doctrines.
32
Unlike its predecessors, though, Hackworth's Digest contains two
statements that appear to be precursors of the Restatement doctrine.
First, Hackworth's quotes the following statement from a law review
article by Edwin Dickinson: "If the treaty was intended to be self-
executing, it has immediately the effect of law. If not, it requires
legislation before it can become a rule for the courts.",321 Standing alone,
this quotation appears to support the Restatement doctrine. However, if
one reads what Dickinson actually wrote, including the portions omitted
from Hackworth's summary, it is clear that Dickinson was referring to
the distinction between executory and executed treaty provisions:
If the treaty was intended to be self-executing, it has immediately
the effect of law. If not, it requires legislation before it can become a
rule for the courts .... " An examination of the decisions of the
Supreme Court on this topic will show there is no practical
distinction whatever as between a statute and a treaty with regard
to its becoming presently effective, without awaiting further
legislation. A statute may be so framed as to make it apparent that
it does not become practically effective until something further is
done, either by Congress itself or by some officer or commission
intrusted with certain powers with reference thereto. The same may
be said with regard to a treaty. Both statutes and treaties become
presently effective when their purposes are expressed as presently
effective.""32 6
Thus, whereas Dickinson was clearly endorsing the Foster doctrine,
Hackworth's Digest, by omitting key language, made it appear as if
Dickinson was endorsing the Restatement doctrine.
not support the Restatement doctrine, see supra notes 257-264 and 281-284 and
accompanying text.
32 GREEN HAYWOOD HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1943) [hereinafter
Hackworth DIGEST].
324 See Treaties, 5 Hackworth DIGEST, § 488, at 179 (constitution requires that treaty
effecting change in existing revenue laws "must be carried into operation by an Act of
Congress") (Whitney doctrine); id. at 184-85 ("provisions of this treaty relating to the
diversion of water from the Niagara River were intended to operate presently and
[therefore] additional legislation is not necessary") (Foster doctrine).
321 Id., § 488, at 177 (quoting Edwin D. Dickinson, Are the Liquor Treaties Self-Executing?,
20 AM. J. INT'L L. 444, 449(1926)).
326 Dickinson, supra note 325, at 449 (quoting United Shoe Mach. Co. v. Duplessis Shoe
Mach. Co., 155 F. 842, 845 (1907)) (emphasis added).
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The second statement in Hackworth's that could be construed to
support the Restatement doctrine is a quotation from Robertson v. General
Electric Co.:327 "Assuming that a treaty provision affecting patents may be
made self-executing, so that no supporting legislation is necessary under
the Constitution to give rise to individual rights thereunder, we are
satisfied that section 308 was not intended to be, and is not, such a self-
executing provision." 3 8 Careful review of Robertson reveals that the
Justice Department endorsed the Restatement doctrine to support the
government's litigating position in a case where the government was an
interested party. Although the Fourth Circuit ruled in favor of the
government, it is unclear whether the court was embracing the Justice
Department's rationale. °
A search of all federal and state cases published before 1965 shows
that Robertson is the only judicial opinion published before the
Restatement (Second) that appears to endorse the Restatement
doctrine. 331 Thus, prior to 1965 there was virtually no doctrinal support
for the Restatement doctrine.
327 32 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1929).
" Treaties, 5 Hackworth DIGEST, supra note 323, § 488, at 178 (quoting Robertson, 32
F.2d at 499-500).
" In Robertson, G.E. sued the Commissioner of Patents in an attempt to compel him to
issue a patent. 21 F.2d 214 (D.Md. 1927). For G.E. to prevail, it had to persuade the court
that the Treaty of Berlin had extended the deadline for filing a German patent application
in the United States. Id. at 214. The United States moved to dismiss the complaint on
several grounds, one of which was that "[i]t was not the intention of the parties to the
Treaty of Berlin that the provisions pertaining to patents should become [domestically]
effective until ratified by an act of Congress." Id. at 214-15. The government's argument in
Robertson implicitly endorses the Restatement doctrine because the argument makes sense
only if one assumes that the treaty makers have the power to prevent a treaty from
becoming domestically effective at the time it is internationally effective, even if automatic
conversion is not constitutionally barred.
See Robertson, 32 F.2d at 499-500.
The author ran the following search in the "ALLCASES-OLD" database on Westlaw:
(treaty /s "self-executing") & intent. The author ran an identical search in the
"ALLCASES" database, with a date limit before Jan. 1, 1965. The two searches yielded a
total of 34 hits. Careful review of those 34 cases shows that, aside from Robertson, there
were only two decisions by any state or federal court published before 1965 that explicitly
identified "intent" as a relevant criterion in determining whether a particular treaty
provision is self-executing: Bowater Steamship Co. v. Patterson, 303 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1962)
and Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1952). Bowater applied the direct remedial version
of the intent thesis, and Sei Fujii applied the indirect remedial version. Therefore, Robertson
is the only judicial opinion published before 1965 that supports the Restatement doctrine.
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3. The Restatement (Second) and Its Aftermath
Despite the lack of support for the Restatement doctrine prior to 1965,
and despite the stark conflict between that doctrine and the text of the
Supremacy Clause, the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law
unequivocally endorsed the Restatement doctrine. According to the
Second Restatement:
A treaty made on behalf of the United States in conformity with the
constitutional limitations stated in § 118, that [does not] manifest an
intention that it shall become effective as domestic law of the United
States at the time it becomes binding on the United States
(a) is [not] self-executing... and
(b) [does not] supersede inconsistent provisions of earlier acts of
Congress or of the law of the several states of the United
States."2
This summary of self-execution doctrine clearly differs from the Whitney
doctrine because the initial clause refers to treaties made in conformity
with constitutional limitations. Moreover, the Restatement view clearly
differs from either remedial version of the intent thesis, because
subparagraph (b) makes clear that treaties that are non-self-executing, in
the sense provided here, lack the status of primary domestic law.3
Since 1965, many books have been published, in addition to the two
Restatements, that appear to support the Restatement doctrine. The
most recent State Department Digest on International Law quotes the
Restatement (Second) with approval. A study prepared by the
332 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 16, § 141. The quoted language is substantially
the same as § 144 of the Proposed Official Draft, published in 1962. There was no
Restatement (First) of Foreign Relations Law. The 1962 Proposed Official Draft was
effectively the First Restatement.
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law is more ambiguous, but it can
also be construed to endorse the Restatement doctrine. The Restatement (Third) says: "An
international agreement of the United States is "non-self-executing" if the agreement
manifests an intention that it shall not become effective as domestic law without the
enactment of implementing legislation." RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 111(4).
Here, the focus on the parties' intent regarding a treaty's effect "as domestic law," without
reference to international law, suggests that the authors are endorsing a direct version of
the intent thesis, not an indirect version. Moreover, the authors add: "Whether a treaty is
self-executing is a question distinct from whether the treaty creates private rights or
remedies." Id., § 111, cmt. h. This statement suggests that the self-execution issue is a
question of primary law, not remedial law. Taken together, the two statements appear to
endorse the direct primary version of the intent thesis.
' See Treaties, 14 Whiteman DIGEST, supra note 7, § 29, at 310-11.
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Congressional Research Service for the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee supports the Restatement doctrine. 5  Several leading
international law casebooks appear to endorse the Restatement
doctrine.3 However, none of these books attempts to justify the key
assumption underlying the Restatement doctrine: that the treaty makers
have the power to countermand the Supremacy Clause.
A survey of judicial decisions since 1965 shows that few lower federal
courts have explicitly endorsed the Restatement doctrine, but many
lower federal courts have implicitly accepted that doctrine. There are
numerous decisions by federal courts of appeals that reflect a primary
law concept of self-execution: that is, they state or imply that the term
"non-self-executing" means that a treaty provision lacks the status of
primary domestic law in the absence of implementing legislation.3'
Many other decisions by federal courts of appeals explicitly identify
intent as a relevant criterion for distinguishing between self-executing
and non-self-executing treaties.ns The combination of a primary law
3 See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., 103D CONG., 1ST SESS., TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 47-49 (Comm.
Print 1993).
3' See, e.g., CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 9, at 180-83; DAMROSCH, supra note 5, at 206-
07; STEINER, supra note 9, at 556. But see PAUST, LAW AND LITIGATION, supra note 9, at 172-
79 (critiquing doctrine of non-self-executing treaties).
33 See, e.g., Cheung v. United States, 213 F.3d 82, 94 (2d Cir. 2000) (defining self-
executing treaty as "one that operates of itself without the aid of legislation"); United States
v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 67 (1st Cir. 2000) (Selya, J., concurring) (defining self-executing treaty as
one that "takes effect upon ratification and requires no separate implementing statute");
Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon S.A., 203 F.3d 116, 128 (2d Cir. 2000) ("Although the
Supreme Court had already ruled [a trademark treaty] to be self-executing... Congress
simply was not sure whether the trademark treaties had acquired the force of law.");
United States v. Balsys, 119 F.3d 122, 138 n.13 (2d Cir. 1997) ("Extradition treaties are self-
executing, and therefore do not require implementing legislation to be binding as law.");
United States v. Grigsby, 111 F.3d 806, 814 (11th Cir. 1997) ("Article VIII of [treaty on
endangered species] requires each signatory to enact laws to effectuate the treaty, which is
not self-executing."); Stephens v. Am. Int'l Ins. Co., 66 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 1995)
("Convention is not self-executing, and therefore, relies upon an Act of Congress for its
implementation.").
' See, e.g., McKesson HBOC, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 271 F.3d 1101, 1107 (D.C.
Cir. 2001) (stating that treaties "provide no basis for private lawsuits unless implemented
by appropriate legislation or intended to be self-executing"); Beazley v. Johnson, 242 F.3d
248, 267 (5th Cir. 2001) ("The Senate's intent was clear - the treaty is not self-executing.");
Lidas, Inc. v. United States, 238 F.3d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 2001) ("We must decide whether
the treaty partners would have intended for articles 27 and 28 of the treaty to be 'fully
operative' as self-executing provisions even if the remainder of the treaty was non-self-
executing .... ); Barapind v. Reno, 225 F.3d 1100, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000) ("[Tlhe Protocol was
not intended to be self-executing."); Li, 206 F.3d at 71 (Torruella, C.J.,
concurring/dissenting) ("[W]e should look to the 'intent' of the treaty to determine
whether it is self-executing."); Goldstar (Panama) S.A. v. United States, 967 F.2d 965, 968
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concept of self-execution with an intent-based criterion for
distinguishing between self-executing and non-self-executing treaty
provisions yields the Restatement doctrine: Whether a particular treaty
provision has the status of primary domestic law depends upon whether
the treaty makers intended it to have the status of primary domestic law.
Although many judicial opinions reflect a primary law concept of self-
execution, and many others rely on intent to distinguish between self-
executing and non-self-executing treaty provisions, very few judicial
opinions unambiguously endorse the Restatement doctrine's
combination of a primary law concept with intent-based criteria.39
Even so, the Restatement (Second) has had a tremendous influence on
the evolution of non-self-execution doctrine. 4 ' Despite the fact that the
United States has never entered into a treaty with a provision designed
to prevent automatic conversion,34' many lower federal courts since 1965
have mistakenly construed other types of treaty provisions as if they
manifested the treaty makers' intent to prevent automatic conversion.3
(4th Cir. 1992) ("Courts will only find a treaty to be self-executing if the document, as a
whole, evidences an intent to provide a private right of action."); More v. Intelcom Support
Servs., Inc., 960 F.2d 466, 469 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating that treaties "do not provide the basis
for a private lawsuit unless they are intended to be self-executing").
Since 1990, there has been only one published decision by a federal appellate court
that explicitly endorses both a primary law concept of self-execution, and an intent-based
criterion for distinguishing between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties, and that
was a dissenting opinion. See Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Baker, 949 F.2d 1109, 1114
(11th Cir. 1991) (Hatchett, J., dissenting) (stating that treaty "affects the domestic law of the
United States... to the extent that it is self-executing" and "that in determining self-
execution, courts consider the parties' intent" ).
i' Since publication of the Restatement (Third) in 1987, courts rarely cite the Second
Restatement. Even so, courts continue to rely on judicial opinions, such as United States v.
Postal, 589 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1979), which in turn relied on the Second Restatement. See id.
at 878 (relying on Second Restatement to support conclusion that United States did not
intend, by ratifying Convention on the High Seas, "to incorporate the restrictive language
of article 6... into its domestic law" ). Four federal appellate opinions in the last three
years have cited Postal as authority with respect to self-execution doctrine. See United
States v. Duarte-Acero, 296 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2002); Lidas, Inc. v. United States, 238 F.3d
1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Duarte-Acero, 208 F.3d 1282, 1284 n.8 (11th Cir.
2000); Li, 206 F.3d at 71 (Torruella, C.J., concurring/dissenting).
34 See supra notes 297-308 and accompanying text.
32 See, e.g., United States v. Grigsby, 111 F.3d 806, 814 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species is not self-executing); Stephens
v. Am. Int'l Ins. Co., 66 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards did not supersede a Kentucky
statute because it is not self-executing); United States v. Gonzalez, 776 F.2d 931, 937-38
(11th Cir. 1985) (holding that Article 6 of Convention on the High Seas is not self-
executing); Postal, 589 F.2d at 878 (concluding that United States did not intend, by
ratifying Convention on the High Seas, "to incorporate the restrictive language of article
6... into its domestic law").
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Moreover, acting under the pernicious influence of the Restatement
(Second), courts dutifully give effect to that presumed intent without
even asking whether the treaty makers have the power to countermand
the Supremacy Clause.
The Eleventh Circuit's recent decision in International Cafr illustrates
the problem.343 In that case, a foreign plaintiff brought a trademark claim
against a U.S. corporation, relying in part on the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property.3" The court stated that the "Paris
Convention is not self-executing because, on its face, the Convention
provides that it will become effective only through domestic
legislation."34" In support of this conclusion, the court cited article 17 of
the Convention, which states: "It is understood that at the time an
instrument of ratification or accession is deposited on behalf of a
country, such country will be in a position under its domestic law to give
effect to the provisions of the Convention."4
The Eleventh Circuit's analysis is wrong, as a matter of constitutional
law, because the conclusion that the Convention lacks the status of
primary domestic law implicitly assumes that the treaty drafters have
the constitutional power to preclude automatic conversion of the
Convention. Moreover, the court's analysis is wrong as a matter of
treaty interpretation because article 17 does not say that implementing
legislation is required to give the Convention domestic legal effect;37
rather, article 17 creates an international legal obligation to ensure that
the Convention is applied domestically. In short, by mistakenly relying
on the Restatement doctrine, the court misinterpreted article 17 to mean
exactly the opposite of what it says. Whereas article 17 creates an
unambiguous duty to apply the Convention domestically, the court
construed article 17 to mean that it was powerless to apply the
- Int'l Cafe, S.A.L. v. Hard Rock Cafe Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc., 252 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2001).
See generally Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, July 14, 1967,
53 Stat. 1780, 24 U.S.T. 2140 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
" Int'l Cafg, S.A.L., 252 F.3d at 1277 n.5.
' Paris Convention, supra note 344, art. 17.
" In fact, treaties never include provisions that purport to answer the question whether
implementing legislation is required to give the treaty domestic legal force because that is a
question of domestic constitutional law, not a question of international law. See 1 SIR
ROBERT JENNINGS & SIR ARTHUR WATTS, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW § 21 (9th ed.
1992) ("From the standpoint of international law.., the choice between the direct reception
and application of international law, or its transformation into national law by way of
statute, is a matter of indifference .... These are matters for each state to determine for
itself according to its own constitutional practices.").
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Convention domestically in the absence of implementing legislation.34
International Cafig's reliance on an unstated and erroneous constitutional
premise to support its mistaken interpretation of a treaty provision
exemplifies the doctrinal confusion created by the Restatement doctrine.
In sum, widespread support for the Restatement doctrine cannot
justify the continued application of that doctrine. There was virtually no
support for the Restatement doctrine prior to 1965 and the Supreme
Court has never endorsed the Restatement doctrine. Furthermore, there
is no evidence that the treaty makers have ever drafted a treaty provision
that was intended to prevent automatic conversion.349 Even so, since the
Restatement (Second) implicitly endorsed the proposition that the treaty
makers have the power to prevent automatic conversion, the
Restatement doctrine has induced courts to misinterpret treaties by
reading into the text an intent to preclude automatic conversion, even in
cases where the treaty makers did not have any such intent. Moreover,
judicial application of the Restatement doctrine undermines treaty
compliance without advancing any legitimate policy goal.
VI. A FRAMEWORK FOR JUDICIAL ANALYSIS
The intent thesis holds that the intent of the treaty makers determines
whether a treaty is self-executing or non-self-executing. The intent thesis
is not wrong, as such, but it is problematic because its apparent
simplicity deceives courts into confusing several distinct issues. That
confusion sometimes yields judicial opinions that are premised on
erroneous, unstated constitutional assumptions. Moreover, some
judicial applications of the intent thesis unjustifiably subvert U.S.
compliance with its treaty obligations.
Part VI sketches an analytic framework for courts to apply, in cases
where individuals claim a right under a treaty, to determine whether a
specific treaty provision is judicially enforceable. 3", The framework
applies generally to cases in which litigants assert treaty-based rights,
either offensively or defensively, in state or federal court. The proposed
framework divides the self-execution inquiry into a series of discrete
The main holding of the case was that the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim. See Int'l Cafr, S.A.L., 252 F.3d at 1276-79. It is unclear
whether a correct analysis of the self-execution issue would have altered that holding.
" See supra notes 297-308 and accompanying text.
' The proposed framework does not address cases where Congress has enacted
implementing legislation for the specific treaty provision at issue. In such cases, the court
need not decide whether the treaty provision is enforceable because the court can enforce
the statute.
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steps that distinguish questions of international law from questions of
domestic law, and questions of primary law from questions of remedial
law. The proposed framework also separates questions that require
analysis of the treaty makers' intentions from questions that must be
answered without reference to the treaty makers' intentions because they
concern matters that the treaty makers are powerless to control. By
employing this framework, courts can avoid constitutional error and also
avoid decisions that unjustifiably subvert U.S. compliance with its treaty
obligations.
The first step in the analysis is to determine whether the treaty
provision at issue creates a primary international duty. This is a
question of international law. Analysis of the treaty makers' intentions is
relevant because a treaty provision creates a primary international duty
if and only if the treaty makers intended to create a primary international
duty. If the treaty provision does not create a primary international
duty, then individuals cannot claim rights under the treaty because a
right is "the mere obverse of" a duty. Thus, a treaty provision that
does not create a primary international duty is not judicially enforceable
by private litigants. If the treaty provision does create a primary
international duty, the court should proceed to step two.
Step two addresses the nature and content of the primary international
duty. This is strictly a question of treaty interpretation, which should be
analyzed in accordance with generally accepted principles applicable
352thereto. The treaty makers' intentions are relevant to step two because
a treaty is interpreted "in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its
object and purpose." 313 In step two, the court should determine, inter alia,
whether the primary international duty at issue is executed or executory,
and whether it is vertical or horizontal.3 These distinctions will be
crucial in step four below.
Having determined the content of the primary international duty, the
court should then consider (in step three) whether the treaty creates a
primary domestic duty. This is a question of domestic constitutional
35 HART & SACKS, supra note 38, at 137.
" For a concise summary of treaty interpretation principles, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD),
supra note 5, § 325. See also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, arts.
31, 32, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
Id., art. 31, para. 1.
See supra notes 107-125 and accompanying text (discussing distinctions between
executory and executed treaty provisions and between vertical and horizontal provisions).
2002]
HeinOnline  -- 36 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 81 2002-2003
82 University of California, Davis [Vol. 36:1
law, not a question of international law.355 If a given treaty provision
creates a primary international duty that is binding on the United States
as a matter of international law, then the Supremacy Clause dictates that
the provision also creates a corresponding primary domestic duty,
unless the Constitution precludes automatic conversion of the specific
356international duty into a primary domestic duty. In step three, the
treaty makers' intentions are irrelevant because the treaty makers lack
the constitutional power to prevent automatic conversion of a primary
international duty that is within the scope of the treaty makers' domestic
357lawmaking powers. If the court concludes that the treaty provision at
issue does not create a primary domestic duty, then the analysis is
complete, because the court cannot enforce an international duty that
does not give rise to a corresponding domestic duty.-3 8 If the subject
treaty provision does create a primary domestic duty, the court should
proceed to step four.
In step four, the focus shifts from primary domestic law to domestic
remedial law. The court must consider whether the primary domestic
duty created by the treaty is the type of duty that is enforceable by a
domestic court. Domestic separation of powers principles suggest that
courts are generally not competent to enforce indeterminate, executory
or horizontal duties at the behest of private litigants; however, courts are
competent to enforce a treaty-based duty that is vertical, executed, and
determinate.3 5 9 Whether a treaty-based duty is vertical, and whether it is
executed, are questions of international law that should be resolved in
accordance with the treaty interpretation principles referenced in step
two above. Whether a treaty-based duty is sufficiently determinate to be
judicially enforceable is a question of degree that implicates both
domestic separation of powers principles and international treaty
_ It is not necessary in every case for the court to decide whether the treaty creates a
primary domestic duty. In accordance with the Ashwander principle, the court might
legitimately duck the constitutional question if the answer is unclear and the case can be
decided on other grounds. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (stating that courts should "refrain from passing upon
[constitutional issues] unless obliged to do so..."). What is critical, though, is that the
court should recognize that the question whether a treaty creates a primary domestic duty
is a constitutional law question, not a treaty interpretation issue.
See supra part V.A.
See supra part V.B.
s To be more precise, if an international treaty duty does not give rise to a
corresponding domestic duty, the court cannot apply that treaty provision as a rule of
decision. However, the court might still apply the treaty provision as a guide to
interpretation of other legal provisions. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 104-125 and accompanying text.
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interpretation principles. As a general rule, though, if a treaty provision
is sufficiently determinate that a court can ascertain, as a matter of
international law, whether there has been a violation, then the provision
is sufficiently determinate to be enforced by a domestic court.
Assuming that the treaty provision at issue creates a primary domestic
duty of a type that the judiciary is competent to enforce, the court should
then consider (step five) whether the treaty makers intended to limit or
preclude judicial enforcement of the treaty. In step five, the court should
adopt a presumption that the treaty makers did not intend to limit or
preclude judicial enforcement, but that presumption should be
rebuttable by clear evidence of a contrary intent.360 If the court concludes
that the treaty makers did intend to limit or preclude judicial
enforcement, then the court should honor that intent. 61 subject to the
proviso that there are some constitutionally compelled remedies for
treaty violations, and the treaty makers lack the power to prevent courts
from providing a remedy that is constitutionally compelled. 2  If the
court concludes that the treaty makers did not intend to limit or preclude
judicial enforcement, then the treaty is judicially enforceable.
The conclusion that the treaty is judicially enforceable does not
necessarily mean that the party asserting a treaty-based right is entitled
to the specific judicial remedy that he or she seeks. In cases where a
plaintiff in a civil action seeks to enforce a treaty offensively, the plaintiff
must show that he or she has a valid cause of action.363 More broadly,
the court must also consider, inter alia: (a) whether the party against
whom the treaty is being invoked actually violated the treaty; (b)
whether the party invoking the treaty suffered a cognizable injury as a
result of that treaty violation; and (c) whether it is appropriate for the
court to grant the specific remedy requested. Detailed analysis of these
issues is beyond the scope of this Article.3 However, it bears emphasis
that analysis of these issues in treaty cases is no different, in principle,
Such a presumption is justified because, by the time the court has reached step five,
the court has already determined that the treaty creates a primary domestic duty of a type
that the judiciary is competent to enforce. Judicial refusal to enforce such a duty is at odds
with rule of law principles. Therefore, a determination that such a duty is not judicially
enforceable can be justified only if there is clear evidence of a political intent to preclude
judicial enforcement.
"' If the court concludes that the treaty makers intended to limit judicial enforcement,
but did not intend to preclude judicial enforcement altogether, then the court should not
impose any greater limits on judicial enforcement than the treaty makers intended.
See supra notes 181-195 and accompanying text.
See VAzquez, Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 47, at 1143-57.
For a thoughtful analysis of these issues, see id. at 1133-61.
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from the analysis courts employ to determine the availability of judicial
remedies for violations of federal statutes, because a treaty-based
prima y domestic duty is essentially equivalent to a primary statutory
duty.
In applying the proposed framework, courts should be guided by two
general principles. First, in cases where an individual has been harmed
as a result of a treaty violation, courts should provide a meaningful
remedy,3 unless clearly established limits on judicial authority bar a
judicial remedy.37 Second, in cases where the U.S. has a treaty obligation
to provide domestic judicial remedies for treaty violations, 368 courts
should give effect to that obligation 3 69 except in cases where they are
powerless to do so, or where there is clear evidence that the political
branches have made a political decision to violate the treaty. Courts'
failure to act in accordance with these principles subverts U.S.
compliance with its treaty obligations, and undermines the rule of law,
without promoting any separation of powers values.
See, e.g., Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) (stating that a treaty is
"equivalent to an act of the legislature... ").
I The consistent refusal of state courts to provide judicial remedies for acknowledged
violations of article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations contravenes this
principle. See, e.g., State v. Martinez-Rodriguez, 33 P.3d 267, 271-74 (N.M. 2001).
" For example, where a federal habeas petitioner alleges a violation of article 36 of the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations after failing to raise the issue in state court, the
procedural default doctrine will bar a judicial remedy in all or most cases. See Breard v.
Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375-76 (1998).
See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
Giving effect to the obligation to provide domestic remedies means, first,
determining whether there has been a treaty violation, and second, providing an effective
remedy if there has been a violation.
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